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The Need for a Revitalized Common
Law of the Workplace·
William R. Corbett'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1960 only two major federal statutory laws regulated
employment in the United States. The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935.' The NLRA was
followed by the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.' For the next
twenty-five years, no federal labor statutes were enacted. Then,
for a thirty-year period beginning in 1963, Congress enacted a
host of employment laws: the Equal Pay Act,• Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA),' the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA),' the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),' the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (POA),' the
0 2003 Wiiiiam R. Corbett. All Rl1hui l!Merved.
' Franlr. I... Man;.1 Proreuor ol IAw, Paul M. Hebert !Aw Ceol6 of
Louiaiana Silla Unlvertl1'7. Earlier drafta or llU. artlcla wan preoen~ IO ruulty ..
lhe Univusity or ~rgia School of !Aw, 10 1tudonui In Proroooor Rebocca Hanner
While'• Low o('tho Worliploa aeminar ot the Unlvcrolty or~rgia School art.aw, and
to the Federallot Society at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center. I appreciate the valuable
input I received from faculty and 11tudenta &t eoch t.hose preaentationa. I al8o t.h3nk
Michael Sclmi, Rebocco lianner Whito, and David Wo11t for helpful comments on an
earlier draf\. ort.hi1 article.

or

' Pub. L. No. 74- 198, 49 SlAt. 449 (1985) (codilied .. amended at 29 U.S .C.
H 151·69 (2000)).
' Pub. L. No. 75-71S, 52 Stat. 1060 (193S) (codified aa amended at 29 U.S.C.
H 201-19 (2000)).
• Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codifted u aJMnded at 29 U.S.C. f
206(d){2000)).

' Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 StaL 66 (1964) (codilied a1 amended at 42 U.S.C. ff
2000a to 2000o-15 (2000)).
' Pub. L. No. 90·202, Sl Stat. 602 (1967) (codified •• amended at 29 U.S.C.
H 62l-33a (2000)).
• Pub. L. No. 91-596, S4 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S .C.
t§ 651·78 (2000)).
' Pub. L. No. 93-406, S8 Stat. 29 (1974) (codified a• amended at 29 U.S .C. H
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Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA),' the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act)," the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)," the Civil
Rights Act of 1991" and the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (FMLA)." The first three years of the 1990s, with the
enactment of three major laws, is a particularly notable period
for the proliferation of employment legislation.~ However, the
FMLA, the last generally applicable federal employment law, is
now ten years old. Since 1993, legislation has been proposed
but stalled in Congress."
From the dearth of federal employment legislation since
1993, one might conclude that no significant employment
issues have arisen or that another means has been found for
1001-1481(2000)).
' Pub. L. No. 9&·655, 92 Slot. 2076 (19'18) (codified 88 omondcd al 42 U.S.C.
f 2000o(k) (2000)).
' Pub. L. No Ul0-347, 102 SU.I. 6<18 (1938)(codified u •-nded 1129 U.S.C.
ff 2001-09 (2000)).
" Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 StoL 890 (1088) (codified a1 1n1ended at 20 U.S .C.
ti 2101-09 (2000)).
" Pub. L. No. 101 -338, 104 Su.t. 827 0990) (codlfiocl u amended at 42 U.S .C.
t 12101-12213 (2000)~
" Pub. L. No. 102-166, 106 SU.t. 1071 (1891) (codifted 11 42 U.S .C. fl981a
and other oeottered •ectJons of 42 U .S .C. (2000)).
" l'ub. L. No. 103-3, 10? Stet. 6 (1998) (eodlfiocl at 29 U.S.C. H 2601-64
(2000)).
H One
or 1augin1 th1 ucendancy of an area of \he law ia to oonaidnr law
school curricula. Sn Thoma• C. Kohlor, Th• o;.1n1t1rotion of Low Lou>: Sot... No"•
for a Comp<>rative Stud;y of L<gaJ Tron•formation, 73 NarRE DAME L. Rl!v. 1311 ( 1998).

••Y

Until en1ployment. ditcrfmination appeared in lho 1970• in law achool curricula, labor
Jaw in bolh 1cholanhlp and curricula meant collocllve bargalnlnc and the N1lional
Wbor Rel11iona Act.. Steven L. WUlbom, lndiulduol Employmrnl RighU and IM
S14ndard &onomU: O/uc<tion: n_,, and Empirici1m, 61 lfU. L. Rl!v. 101 ( 1988).
Even after employment ditcrimlnatlon became e1tabli1hed in law school.a, it would be

the early· t.o mid·l9901 before emp1oyinent law became a coune otTering. Douglu L.
Leolie, Reltliifl/J th• lnlernalio11a/ Poper Story, 102 YAI..E L.J. 1807, 1906 n .32 (1993)
(noti:n1 that. law acboola we.re 1t.artlng t.o offer "cmplQYIDe.nt law" cour1e., and
predlcUni that they would p.ab •1abor law" ln1o the ap<dalty catqory~ Steven
Howard Kropp, ll<thin••nx tit• Low and Emp/-nt Low Cumculum: Lqal
EducaJion'• Belated R11pon.ae to the !hmi1e of ColleclifJe Bo.rgainlfl8 and tit• Rln of
lrldiuidual Rig/lta, 60 U. CIN. L. R~v. 433 (1991) (book review) (reviewing individual
employment rights cuebookal.
~ Coc>lider, for ..ample, lho Employment Non·Discriminal.ion AA:t, which
would amend Title VII of the Civil Righi. Act of 19&4 lo prohibit employmut
di1Crimina\ion based on Mxua1 orientation. The bill waa reintroduced io the Houae ..ad
Senate on Jul;y 31, 2001. That bill was fir&t introduced in 1994. ENDA Will ht Rr·
Introduced in Congrea on July 31, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 30, 2001(No.145), at
AB. Electronic monitoring bills have been introduced 1iru:e the early 1000., but none
have been enacted. Stt in{ro no<eo 150-58 and amompanying text. Geoetic
discrimi.netion bi.111 have been introduced in recent congressional ansions. but they
have not been enacted. Stt infra notos 171-76 and accompanying text.

2003)

REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

93

addressing such issues. Yet, the need to protect employees from
abuses in the workplace has not significantly dissipated, and in
some respects may have increased. Disrespect, incivility,
humiliation of workers," and the invasion of their privacy" are
not rare in American workplaces. Indeed, science and
technology have posed at least three significant new threats to
the dignity and autonomy of workers. First, workers today fear
the Orwellian nightmare that "Big Brother"" employer will
invade their privacy by using technology to record their
conversations, monitor their e-mail communications, and track
their Internet use." Second, it is possible that employers may
obtain genetic information about their employees and use it to
decide whom to hire, fire, promote, or subject to other
employment actions." Although generally treated as an
" Seo, ..... Catherine L. Fi1k, Huml/iatron ot WOI'•. S WM. It MAAY J ,
WOMEN It L. 73 (2001); 01vld C. Yamodo, 1'111 l'htnomtnon of •wor•pl- Bui/yins·
and th• Nttd fbr Stalfl1·Bll11d H°'tih \Vor• &nulro11m1111 Prot«tion, 88 Gl!IO. L.J. 475
(2000); The Work11t1co Bullying & Trauma lntUtuto Wobtilte (fonnorly the Camvoll!l'
Againot Workplooo Bullyln1l. 01 ht.tp://www.bullylnjJln1tltuto.org ()o.t violtcd Fob. 13,
2003); Mnrllyn Elloa, St111/y: RudM•" 11 Po/101111111 U.S. \Vol'kploCB; Dh,..•P«t Car1H1
Anxum1 &mploy<.,, Low•r Pruductiuity, USA TODAY, Juno 14, 2001, nt 01; PaL l<Jirlnk,
Rudt, Rud#, Rude: Worltplace lficiuilfly / 1 on the RIM ond Conipat,ftr A.I'll T"•'-nl
Notice, Clll. DAILY Ht:RALD, Fob. 27, 2001, at I; &ffttt• of Wor•ptoce lncwlllly
Wid•1Pffl1d, Li..ly to Llflll'r, R<""'1'Ch Stud:/ Cot1cliid11, DAILY I.All. REP. (BNM, June
19, 2001 !No. 117), 11114.
n ~ardin1 the varloua typeo or invA1ion of privacy, - pnerally MAm1sw
W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (1996 It Cumulative. Supp. 1997 6. Supp.

2001). In the Mminal article 04 lhe right or privacy, Warren and Br11ndei1 wrot.a that
in cate1 of lnt.ru1lon lnt.o privacy, the violation 11 ll •bJow LO human di.gnlty, an u11ult
on human pereonality." 81\muol D. \Van-en & Louil D. Brandeia, TM Right to Privacy,
4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197· 198 (1890~ ... al•a Pnullno 1'. Klm, Prioocy Ri11ht1, P11bllc
Policy, and Ill• &mploymont Relation•hip, 57 01110 S·r. L..J. 671 (1996).
.

" m:onoE onwew,, 1984 (1949).
,. Sct, r.g.. Am. Mgmt. Ass'n, 2001 S11ru")': IVorkploce Moni1ori1111 &
Survcdll.onu: PoJicie1 01'd Practias (Aug. ? , 2001), result.a rrprintft;/ in Emplqywr1
Watching Comput., U1e for wgnl Liability, AMA Survey Find•, DAILY LAB. RIU'.
<BNA). Aur. 9, 2001 (No. 153), at A5 (reportinr th•t, of 496 omploye"' 1urveyed, more
than 60\llo monitor omployea' Internet connectiona, and obout

47~

store aod review

employ_. e-mail-~ Jay P. Keaan, Cy/J<r·WOl'•lfll or Cybu.Shiriing1 A Finl
Principia E;mmlnotion of El«tro"ic Prioocy in IM IVOl'Aplace, 54 FIA L. REV. 289
(2002); Eric P. Robin10n, Bl1 Brother or Alod.ern AIC11to1tment: E-Mail .\lon1lonn1 in
1/wr Private \Varkploct, 17 LAB. l..\w. 3ll (2001); $. Elizabeth Wilborn, Rtui•itini/ the
Public/PrivoJe Di.lti11ction: EmplO)•ee Monilori11g in tl1e \Vorltplace, 32 GA. L. REv. 826
(1998); Chatlos E. Frayer, Note, En1plo:lft Privacy and b1ter11et J.fo11itoring: &lancing
\Vorkcrs' Righta and Dlsuu,. \Vith Legiliniote Mo11agan1e11t l11tere•tt1. 57 Bus. LAW. 867
(2002); Amandn Richman, Note, R.eSlorillg th• Bala11«: Empltzytr LU.bility 011d
Employee Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337 (2001~ Nathan Watson, Note, TM Private
\Varkpl- and th• Pf'O/J(Md •NOlitt of Elttlroni< Moniwring Act': ls "Nau~· &flOU/!hl,

54 FED. co..... L.J. 79 (2001).

• Su. ,,.., Pauline T. ~ <hn~tic. Diacrimin4li~ <hnelk Privacy:
Rdbinllirvl &mploytt; Protttlioru for a Bro.ue Nt111 \VOl'Ap/a«, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 1497
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employment discrimination issue, employers' obtaining and
using employees' genetic information is more effectively
conceptualized and addressed as an invasion of privacy issue."
A third major issue regarding mistreatment of employees in
the workplace stems, in part, from the fast--paced, around-theclock, pressure-packed work environment of the global market.
Workers are complaining of bullying and harassment by their
supervisors and co-workers." For many, the abuse they suffer
in the workplace may affect both their health and quality of
life, as well as their employer's productivity and ability to
provide a safe workplace.
Facing problems of electronic monitoring, genetic
discrimination, and harassment (not linlited to abuse based on
protected status>. as well as increasing public attention to
these issues, Congress might respond, as it bas to past
workplace problems, with federal legislation. Both members of
Congress and many employee rights advocates are promoting
fed eral legislation to address these problems. So far, all such
proposals have failed at the federal level and only genetic
discri.mination Jaws have passed at the state level. Still,
employee rights advocates and scholars in the United States
favor individual employment rights legislation, particularly at
the federal level, to address workplace issues.• And why not?
Title VII and the anti-discrimination principles and theories
(2002~

Mary Z. Ma kdl1i, 0.n<lic Privacy: N<10 lntru1/<H1 o N•w TOrl, 34 CRJUGH'T'ON L.
R&v. 965 12oon Oltndora Hugh.., O.neticoll:y Incorrect, 86 Mo. B.J. 34 (Jan.JFeb.
2002); Paul Steven Miller, /1 There A Pitik Slip in My O.n.,r Cl<metic Diocriminatioo In
th< \Vorkplace, 3 J. HEALTH CAREL. & PoL. 225 (2000); Oovld J. Wuldtoch, New Yor4'1
Lqal Rtstriction1 011 Ott E'uployer'• Cotlectio11 ond U11« of fJtt Empl,oyec,1 Genetic
lnformatio11, 9 Al.II. l...J. SCI. & 'l'ECH. 39 Cl998); J ared A. Feldm•n & Richard J . Kats,
Not.e, Genetic Ttt.1tin1 & Dltcrimination in Employme11t: Rttoo'n,,1ending a Uniform
Swtutory Approach, 19 HOF!ITRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389 (2002). In lhe inlt.ial lawouit of
it.I kind, the EEOC auod Burlington Northml Sant.I Fe Railway Co. for genetic te1tinJ
of employeeo, aUesina a violation of the Americana with Dlaabiliti.. Art.. On May 6,
2002. the case ..utod for $2.2 million. &. EEOC'• Pint O.nttic Tuting Cholk...,.
Sfltl«l for #2 Million, Partin Announco, DAILY LA& R&P. (BNA), May 9, 2002 (No.
90), at Al ()lereinaller EEOC'• Pini C.Mlic T<11in1 Cho//1nge).
11
Stt infra not.el 177-80 and accompanyin1t.ut;1nol«> Kim.1upra note 20.
n See, 1ource1cited1upro note 16.
u Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt., Meeting the lkrnond• of Worhtr• into thl'
Twonty·First Century: Tile PuJ1m1 of Labor and Employn,.nt Law, 68 lND. L.J . 685, 698
(1993) (noting the current. prorerence ror legiAlat.i ve regulation); Rosa Ehrenrcich,
Dignity ond ~riminotion: Toward ti Plurali1tic Und1r1tcutdi.ng of Workpla"
Hanu•m•nt, SS Goo. L. J . l, 32 o.128 (1999) ("ln part, tho preference for Title Vil
!rather than torta to addrtea har..oment claims) may reOoct a llCholarly bias in favor of
federal law."); cf. J . Wii.on Parker, AJ.WUJ Employm•nt and th< Cammon Law: A
Modal ~l to De·Mo'Tinaliu Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. Rav. 347, 370 (1996)
Oabeling "1'0Dgful diocha'I" lqi1lation "the deus u machloa of employment law").
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that emanate from it are the greatest triumph of employment
Jaw in the United States."
The failure to enact federal legislative responses to
emerging workplace issues does not necessarily signal the
demise of employment law in the United States. What it may
signal is the end of an era, spanning about thirty years, when
federal legislation was the legal method of choice to address
emerging workplace problems. We have reached a point in the
development of American employment law at which the
regulatory panacea for the latter half of the twentieth century
has become very difficult to implement. That situation is likely
to be exacerbated in the years ahead. The era of federal
employment legislation as the predominant type of
employment law may be over - at least for a while.•
Regardless of whether an epoch in employment law
history has passed, at this point in time individual employment
rights legislation is not an appropriate response to these
emerging workplace problems." This is so for three reasons
that apply, to varying degrees, to each of the three issues electronic monitoring, genetic discrimination, and general
harassment. Tho first is "6t." Jt is difficult to draft legislation
that elTectivoly addresses these problems - in other words, that
fits the problems. They require analytical fle.x:ibility that
cannot be readily built into a statute. Such flexibility is
necessary both because of the variety of factual situations, and
the lack of consensus on the societal balancing of the conflicting
interests of employers and employees. On the issue of
electronic monitoring in particular, employers' interests are
numerous and credible; consequently, it is not clear how and

" & t Clydo W. Summen, Emp/oynwnt at \Viii in th• Unilod Stot•a: TIMI
Dfoin• Rilhl of Employen, 8 U. PA. J . LA& A EMP. I.. 66, 66 (2000) (id•ntifyini the
employment antl~t.crimin1lion lawa as •[tlhe on• ronn or relativitly effective Jepl
protection ofworlr.o"'"); -oho Cynthia I.. &tlund, W..-• i"6 T -/tQ: ~ Worlrploor,
Civil Soddy, and tho Low, 89 Gt!O. l...J. I, 61 (2000) (callin1 equal protection and anti·
diJcrimination law "(o)no or the epic legal developmenta or the twentieth century"~ cf.
Kim, aupra note 20, at. 1524 (discussing the early IUOOl:?MM of Title Vil ita batt.1in1

employment diacrin1inat.lon in the decade after it.a paasare, but questioning its current
efficacy).

n I nm not. predicting that no more redornl employment legislation will be
enacted in the foreseeable rut.ure, and I certainly um not urging that result. For 1ome
workplace i.Mues, such as dlscriminaHon againat bomo1exuals, amending Title Vll ta
an obvious reeponM and a natural exteruion ot the ext.ent employment discrimination
lawa. I am e.rgu.ina, however, th.at over~ependeoce on flderal legislation mu.st end.
• l l may MYer be, but as 1 will dilcuu below, it is premature to reach that
condusiorL
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under what circumstances U.S. society should prohibit
electronic monitoring by employers. Nor is it clear for what
types of harassing or bullying conduct, and by what persons,
society should hold employers liable. Further development of
the law is needed on a case-by-case basis. At some point,
sufficient consensus in the case law may develop, allowing
federal or state legislatures to incorporate the standards into a
statute. However, it is also pcssible that some or all of these
issues require the flexibility of common law analysis, as the
cases may be so fact-driven that statutes will never be an
effective method for addressing them. Thus, fit may never be
achieved for one or more of these employment issues.
Second, tho timing is wrong for legislative respcnses to
these problems. Legislation and common law are often
interdependent and dynamic: As one develops to address an
issue inadequately mot by the other, it somet.imes provokes
change in the other. For example, in tho 1970s and 1980s,
common law tort theories proved no answer to the pervasive
problem of sexual harassment. Consequontly, the theory of
sexual harassment was developed under Title VII." Thereafter,
the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress became a reliable alternative theory of recovery for
victims of sexual harassment." Thus, the federal legislation
prompted an evolut.ion in the common law. Conversely, the
common Jaw theories of wrongful discharge and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing led to the passage of the
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act" and other
state statutory responses to wrongful discharge ... Because of
the fit problems discussed above, it is time for common law to
take the lead and provide responses to the emerging workplace
problems of electronlc monitoring, genetic discrimination and
bullying. Legislation may follow later.
Third, despite the success of past employment
legislation, resorting to this method of regulation too often can
generate significant backlash. Statutory employment laws have
problems and weaknesses," and no shortage of opponents who
11

See, e.g., John J. Donohue ID, Aduocacy Ver1u1 Analy•i.tt in Assesaing

Employment Dis<rimlnati<N1 Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1610·11 (1992).

• s..

Mark P. Oerg•n. A Grudging Defen&e of th• Roi• of tile CoUourol Torti
in Wrongful Tmnincuion Liti11atlon, 74 TEx. L. Rsv. 1693, l 70iMO (l996).
• MONT. CODB ANN. fl 39·2·901 to 914 (2002).
" Stt infra notu 260-69 and accompanying texl.
•• Stt, ~., Kim, 1upra note 20~ at 1525-32.
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trumpet those problems. Moreover, legislation provides a far
more concrete target for opponents than evolving common law.
The attack can be launched against the specific legislation or
the general proliferation of statutes regulating the workplace.
Although it may sound unusual to employee rights advocates in
the hire-and-fire legal regime of the United States,• there are
many who criticize the considerable expansion of employment
legislation in the last forty years.• Regardless of one's view
about the need for more employment protections in the United
States, it is undeniable that there was a rapid proliferation of
statutory employment law from 1968 to 1998." Overlap and
conflict among employment laws creates problems" and lends
credibility to the view that we have experienced employment
law sprawl in this nation. For example, some argue that
genetic discrimination laws duplicate protection provided by
the Americans with Disabilities Act .• In short, employment law
bas enough enemies. Its friends need to make careful and
deliberate choices about the methods of regulation for the
future so that they do not play into tho hands of its opponents.
Now is not the appropriate time and these are not the
appropriate issues for enacting new employment legislation.
Emerging workplace issues afford the opportunity to
co.r rect an over-dependence on legislation to regulate
• 'n>omu C. Kobler, TM Bmplgy,,,.nt 11</otion and lu Orrkrl111 at C.ntury'•
Bnd: 11<{1tcti"'1• on Bmtrrl"6 Trtnth In Ill• Un/ltd Su>tu, 41 B.C..L. RltV. 103, 103--04
(1999) c•AJI lo 1•norally well known, the Unl!A>d Sc.atet hiatorically hu provldod

compent.ively meacer formal lepl prot.ect.iona of the employment r-elat.ion1.hip. Forelp
ob1e.rvara t.yplcn.lly charnct.erize us as a 1hirc and flro' 8oclety .. ....).
N Chlof among lhc critics are libertaril\n 1.uld law-and-econom.ic1 1cholar1
such BB Richard Ep11Alln. Su, e.IJ., RICllAllO A . EPSTEIN, PORBIDDEN GROUN06: THE
CA.sE AOAINST EMPWYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); Richard A. Ep11Alln, In
of the Contract al \ViU, 61 u. CHI. L. RltV. 9<17 (1984); ... • 1.. WALTIR OLSON,
THE EXCUSI FACTORY: Row EMPWYMEllT LAW IS PARALYWIG THE AMERICAN

v.r.,...

WORKPLACI (19117),

••pm

.. Kohler,
nol6 32, al 104 c·Dupite OW" miown for relaLl•tly
ahotemioua public inUrvention in worltpla"' relationohipo and our general
for privatAI orderinc, I.he previouo ten to filU>en yearo has been a period ot unuoual
leplative and judicial activity.").
" Clyde W. Summe111, Lobor Low
th• Ctnlury Turn.: A C"4"6in1 of the
Gutud, 67 NED. L. RICV. 7, 18-19 (1988) (predicting that reconciling overlapping
protections would be the most difficult problem In employment law and atatlnr thnt
"'{oJne can acarcoly Imagine an arrangement better deeigned to hold out promi1ee to the
employee, baraea and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, and clog the lctal
machinery.").
" S.n. K.nnedy lo Add,.... Oewic Bia1 Bill'1 Ouu/ap of ADA. Priuoey
ll<plali"'11, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 26, 2001 (No. 143), at Al; Overlap m C.ntlic
Bia1 L<gillati<>n 11 Examined in Houa Htorifll on Bill, DAILY LA.II. REP. <BNA~ J11ly
12. 2001 <No. 133~ al AB.

pref.,.,_

°'
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employment. The stated concerns demonstrate not just that
legislation would be a poor response now, but also s uggest what
is needed: a revitalized common law of the workplace. It is odd
that the common law applicable to one of the most significant
aspects of most people's lives" has fallen into relative
desuetude and is no longer viewed as a viable approach to
addressing workplace problems.
In contrast, during the 1970s and 1980s, state courts
explored innovations in tort and contract Jaw to address
dissatisfactions with perceived abusive discharges under the
employment-at-will doctrine.• Unlike those common law
responses, courts today will not need to create new common
law theories; the tort theories of invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress can be tweaked to do
the job. Notably, however, as with the common law
developments of the earlier period, courts will have to overcome
their concerns that adjusting the tort theories to accommodate
the workplace will impinge too much on employers' power and
prerogative.
It is true that common law development is slow and
incremental compared with the passage of legislation."
Furthermore, it does not have the panache or newsworthiness
of legislation. But the common law does have some advantages.
Its flexibility can accommodate a variety of situations that are
difficult to address through legislation. It permits standards to
evolve as society, in a panorama of cases, considers the

" America.DI work more houn th.an any other people ln lhe world and de.ftne
them1elve1 largely by their work.. U.S. Wor4111 Prit in Lo111er Houn But
0111plM'fd in Producifon, Sny1 Study, DAILY LA.ft. REP. (BNA), Aus. 31, 2001 (No. 169),
at AS (quoting the economiat who led tJle 1urvey for the lnt.em&tlonal Labour

w,,..

Organlution: ..American workers have ll tendency to define ouraalvea by what we do
for a living. Americen workf.t'I keep worldnc longer and loneer and Ionpr houra.
Vicki Sch\lltz,
IVora, 100 COWY. L. REY. 1881, 1886-91 (2000); Katherine V.W.
StolMI, rn.. NtUJ h,cho/<Jlico/ Contro<t: lmplkution• of ti.. Cho111i111 Woriplon For
Labor cmd Emp/.oy~nt Law, 48 UCLA L. RIV. 619 (2001) (diacuuing how work hu
eclipaed othor primary ract.ora in defining 1ociaJ identity); Kohler, 1upra note 32, at 108

u,.·,

·r.

<"IOJno'• life u.k.. on publicly intelligible moaning largely through participation In

market labor. The job not only constitutes one'a chief claim to wealth, but is also the
prime determinant of one'• atatua.")~ Wilbom, tu.pm note 19, at W (noting that people
obn define lhemBelv.. by 0CQ1patio1U1% r(. Eltlund, •upro note 24, at S ("fflhe
wcrkp1- it the single moot important 1ilAI or -rative inl<!ndlon and sociability
amonc adultcitilens ouuide the family.").
• Stt infra not• 235-39 t.nd accompanying text.
" Cf. Anit3 Bernsl.ein, How to Moho a Ntw Tort: Thrtt Paradt»:u, 75 TEx. L.
II.Ev. 1639. 1547 & 1565 (1997) ("The mea1urod, respectful movement of a new tort will
alwoy1 appear feeble to activi111 •• .. ").
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problems presented and works them out individually. Finally,
common law development does not provide a hard target for
opponents of employment law. By the time the target solidifies,
opponents may be willing to support employment statutes,
which then may be viewed as preferable to the common law.
Part II of this Article discusses the emerging workplace
issues of electronic invasion of privacy, genetic discrimination,
and bullying. It considers both the inadequacies of existing law
and proposals for change. Part Ill discusses the current collage
that is the employment law of the United States. It traces the
law's development and considers how various methods of
regulation have been used at various times. Part IV expresses
some specific reservations about using legislation to address
these emerging workplace problems. Finally, Part V discusses
changes that courts must make in tort theories so that they can
adequately address these particular issues.
II. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INVADERS, GENETIC DISCRIMINATORS,
AND BULLIES: THE QUEST FOR LEGAL SOLUTIONS

Invasions of privacy, genetic discrimination, and general
harassment are all manifestations of disrespect and incivility
in the workplace. Many believe that rampant disrespect in the
workplace inilicts deleterious consequences on both employees
and employers." Workplace abuse causes employees
considerable distress." Likewise, electronic monitoring of
employees seriously affects both their mental and physical
health." Additionally, humiliation imposes substantial costs on
employers in terms of lost work time, decreased productivity,

• Se.e, e.g., Kesan, tupra note 19, at. 320; Yamada, 1upra note 16, at 483-84.
41
See-, e.g., Attitudes in the Workplace VIJ: The Se~nth Annual Labor Day
Survey (Harris Interactive 2001) (reporting that more t.h an 35% of workers surveyed
said that their jobs are banning their physical or mental health, and 42% said job
pres&ul'e& were interfering with their personal relationships): Survey Shows Growing

Job Malaise Despite Boom Times in U.S. Labor Market, DAILY LAB. REP. CBNA), Oct.
17, 2000 (Na. 201), at A7. But see Re•iew of Survey Data Firuf• Little Change in Job
Satisfaction Levels OllOF HaJf Cent"ry, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Aug. 28, 2001 (No. 166),
at A5 (reporting findings of American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Researth
based on survey that most Americans aro satisfied with their jobs, and the level of
$atisfaction has remained relatively oonstant for more than fifty yea.rs).
Legal oommentators and others have written on the harm that \vorkplaoe humiliation
causes employees. See sources cited supra note 16.
0

Wilborn, aupra note 19, at.838 nn.47-48 (citing studies).
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poor morale and loss of employees." Even the "epidemic" of
workplace violence" relates to workplace incivility."
Privacy invaders and bullies are the current hobgoblins
in the employment world. That is not to say that
discriminators, the workplace demons of the last century, have
been exorcized. However, a significant segment of society
believes that forty years of powerful legal intervention has
abated virulent workplace discrimination against African
Americans, women, and others. Now, some attention has
shifted to status-neutral (color-blind, sex-blind, etc.) initiatives
to make the workplace more civil for all workers, a place where
the relatively powerful do not bully, invade the privacy of, and
otherwise inflict dignitary harms on the relatively powerless."
Concurrently, attention has shifted away from regulating
abusive discharges to regulating the terms and conditions
during employment."
A.

Privacy Invasion: Electronic Invaders and Genetic
Discriminators
1. Definitions and Examples

Invasion of privacy may be the dominant employment
issue of our time." Although often discussed, privacy is a bard
concept to define." It has been described as "a value asserted by
individuals against the demands of a curious and intrusive
society.... Privacy has to do with an individual's autonomy and
0

See, e.g., Yamsdfl.,8Upra note 16, at483-84.

0

JLO Cites lVorldwide Epidemic, Urges Global Rtsponse to Violence at Work.
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 20, 1998, at A5.
~11 Sa Yamada. 1upra note 16, at 483. A legislntive panel in Ma1:1sachus.etts
studying workplace violence, the Mauachusetts Joint Commit.tee on Public Safety,
recommended that employers adopt ..zero toleranoo policies" on workplace violence,
threats, harassme.nt, and bullying. See Afcu&oc.huselt& Panel Seek1 Zero Tol.erantt,

Humane Police• to Recfuce V'iolencc at Wark, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 25, 2001 (No.
142), at A3. There are two relationships between workplace violence and workplaca
incivility: fir&t.. workplace violence may be the most severe form of incivility; and
second, workplace violence may be pe.rpetrated by victims of workplo.ce ho.rasament

and bullying.
" &e infra Part IJ.B.3.
" &e infra Part JJl.C.
41
See> e.g ., Ke&an, supra note 19, at 292 .
.. Wilborn, tupra note 19, at 832; Kesan, 1upra note 19, st 306; Kim, supra.

not.e 17, at 68.'l-87; Makdisi,supro not.e 20, at 979-80.

'° Robe.rt C. Post, TM Social Founda.t-iont of Privacy: Com.m.unity and Self in
the Common L<>w Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989).
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interest in guarding a realm of intimacy around her inner
penon or hc_r identity." There may be no more succinct and
pragmatically useful definitions than "t.he right to one'•
person.. and lhe "right to be let alone."" Both electronic
monitoring and genetic testing and discrimination" threaten
employec_s' autonomy regarding personal information.
Notwithstanding definitional problem11, most Americans
would agree that privacy is a fundamental and cherished
right.• Still, Americans recognize, at least in some cont.exta,
that their privacy rights arc not absolute. Those rights must bo
balanced against competing societal intereate, and in some
cases t.he balance will be struck in favor of invruiloos of varying
typea and degreee. This recognition was no more evident than
in the af\.ermath of the tragedies of September 11, 2001, when
Americana quickly acknowledged, although regretfully, that to
11ome extent privacy righte must yield to 1ecurity in terests.•
Similarly, the common low tort of invasion of privacy
recognizes both that privacy must be balanced with other
important policies,• and that privacy is alienable."' ProfC11SOr
Robert Post hoa oloquontly described tho delicacy of the
American right to privacy: "That fragility lof privacy norms in
modern life) stoma not merely from our ravenous appetite for
the management of our social environment, but from the
undeniable prerogatives of public accountability.Employcn Invade workplace privacy in many waya a.n d
use different devicca, including paper·and-pcncil examinations,
video cameras, tape recorders, medical examinations and tests,
and computers. Employe.r a have diverse interests in so doing.
An e_mployer may seek to prevent tho following: computer
" WA.n"Ctn A Orandei1. 1upra note 17, at l97~ Kim. 111prn note 20. at 1601:

Poot. ••pro noto 60, al &M: Wilbom, 1upro no1<1 19, 01 83Z-33

• Milditl, . .,,,.. nGte 20, 11 98CHll !ql>Otin1 THOMAS ~I OOol.SY, A
TUATl9 ON Tiii
or TOltT9 Oii TIUI wao.~os WlllCll Aa.ISI l'"DlmlmlC."1' cw
CO.orraACT 29 (2d td. 1888)~ - oho Watnn It Brandcis. '"""' note 17. al 207
" M&kdial, ..,,.,.. """'20. al 98CHll (c:illn1 OOol.SY,
D04oO 62, al 29).
" l<lm. ..,,,,.. D04oO 20, at 1601, 1635.
" W1lbom. 1upro """'19. 11831.
" Stt. ,,.., Shaun B. Sponeer. R-oblc Bxp«tutlon• ond th• &wion o(
Prlvoey, :19 &H 01£00 I.. R&v. 843. 912 (2002)
lhotkln1 Btl>temi.r 11 te"'°""t
au.cb th-i.o to &kew the alreedy 14<1\IOUS balAllCe betw°"' pnvacy and -..n17 In
ol lhe l111er."); ~·ON! Pn'*Y. 18 11'1>1\'llXIAL £MJ' RTs. (BNA) 4 (2001)
(dim-'i"OC ol oaliooal -..rity are erodlac pnvMy)
• ~ "'P"O """' 19, .. :IO:I

uw

'""'°

rmt..

ra-

"' ld. ot306.
• Poot, oupra noto 60, ol 1010.
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crime; dissemination of trade secrets and confidential
information to competitors; use of work time for personal
activities and pursuits; and risky employee conduct that may
result in imposition of liability on the employer for sexual
harassment, defamation, or comput.er crime. Employers also
have an interest in hi ring and promoting employees who are
physically and mentally fit for particular jobs.•
The privacy right of employees is hard to articulat.e in
the abstract. It is the right to be left alone, but almost everyone
would admit that the r.ight, never absolute to begin with,
certainly is further circumscribed by the workplace and the
employer's interests. Still, employee rights advocates insist
that employees have a right of privacy that restricts an
employer from knowing too much about them, controlling them
too closely or emotionally hurting them." The following two
subparts more particularly desc.ribe two types of invasion of
privacy, electronic monitoring and genetic discrimination,
respectively.
a. Electronic Monitoring
The most high-profile workplace privacy issue of the day
is electronic monitoring of employee communications and
activities. It is one of the most prevalent monitoring or
surveillance t.ecbniques, permitting a level of •observation" not
possible through other means"' and causing considerable
• Regarding clect.ronJc monitoring, aee Keann, 111pro not.a 19, at 3 10-16
(d.iscussing emJ)loycrt' rea1on1 ror conducting electronic rnonil.oring of emp)oyeea);
Wat.eo.o., 1upra note 19, at. 101 (u.me); RJehman, &upro note 19 (di11euuing employers'
need to monit.or to attempt. to avoid liability for 1ex-u1d haruame.nt, negligent birina.
and ne.ctige.nt. rete.ntion in caaet of workplace violence). For diecuuioa of potential
employer liobility ror the compu~r crimeo of employ..,, - renerally Mark ilhman,
~I, Compulu Crimu and lh• Rnpond<OI Sup<rior Doctnne: Emp/oyon &won,
6 8 .U. J . SCI. & TUR. L. 6 (2000).
Recarding genetic te.tina. eee Kim, •upro note 20. at 1S3M2; Feldman & Katz.. •upro
note 20, ot 396-97 CdiocuJlinr reaeons for employerw to conduct genetic teslinr of
employees and to take employment actions based on teat mu.Ila).

" Profe.aor Kim cit.ea Lhe following as core areas or privacy: one's body and

bodily function•: perwonal Information relating to health and sexual matters; one'•
home; and traditionally prlvllito communication&. See Klnl, 1upra note 17, at 700-01.
• Kesan, 1upra note 19, at 305; aet o.110 Frayer, 1upra note 19, at 858-59
(diacuuing Silentwat<:h by Adai, Inc., a software package that permit• moniwring that

i1 1urprising in bot.h it.I breadth Md depth). C1earwwift'1 ?.UAtE1weeper software line
lodudes MIMEsweeper, which audit.a individual Web traffic and warns offendt:l'I who
inappropriate 1hee OT view/receive inappropriate ~mail content. &e
http:/Jwww.mimeoweeper.eom/productalmsw/msw_webldefault.aJlp (bat visii..I Aug. 9,
2003). SpectorSolt wuta it& Spector Pro aoftware package with, "When you Aboolu~ly
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distress among employees." Furthermore, electronic monitoring
is an area where technology has outstripped the law, leaving
employees largely unprotected." Some types of electronic
monitoring garnering the most attention are simultaneous
monitoring of computers, such as keystroke monitoring,
retrieval of e-mail messages and stored computer files, and
mapping of Internet sites visited by employees. The 2001
survey by the American Management Association showed that
at least two-thirds of major U.S. firms engage in electronic
monitoring. That number has doubled in the last five years."
Ironically, when employees claim their employer has
injured their dignity by electronic monitoring, employers
sometimes respond that they are promoting civility and
protecting the dignity of other employees. Thus, one person's
invasive, disrespectful act is another's attempt to enforce
respect. For example, in May 2000, Dow Chemical performed
an e-mail audit at its Freeport, Texas plant and found that 254
out of 5,500 employees had saved, filed, or sent sexual or
otherwise inappropriate e-mail." Dow fired twenty employees,
arguing that it was attempting to prevent sexual harassment
and had developed policies to promote respect and
responsibility."
There are of course many other illustrative stories and
lawsuits regarding electronic monitoring in the workplace.
Consider the case of the insurance company executive fired just
three days before his shares of stock, worth millions, were to
vest. His employer said it fired him because he repeatedly
accessed pornographic sites on the Internet while he was at
work.• The executive contended that he did not intentionally
need to know Eyervtbjng they a.re doing online." http://www.spectrosoft.com (last
visited Aug. 18, 2002). Including eBloster 3.0 (for ..mail) and Spector (for computer
screen snapshots), the package otTors "anapshot recording, Email recording,
Chatlln&t.ant Message logs and sophisticated Keystroke journals." Id.
"* \Vilbom, supra note 19, at 838.
" Keean, •uprci note 19, at 304-05; Pat.r ick Boyd, Note, Tipping the Balance
of Power: Employer lntruaion on Emplf-O•ee Privacy Through Tech11ologkal lnnouation,
14 ST. JOJtN'S J . LEGAi. COMMENT. 181, 182 (1999) ('Technological innovation .•. now
permit.a employers to compromise their e mployees by violating their right to privacy in

a way not anticipated by earlier laws.").
M Am. Mmgt. Ass'o, 2001 Survey: Workplace. Afonitoring & SurueiUo.nct:
Policies and Practices, supro note J9,
M Panel Orders Dow C~cal to Reinstate a Dozen Workers Fired for E·Mail
Abuse, DAILY LAB. REP. {BNA), Apr. 16, 2002 CNo. 73), ot A2.
C7 Id. An arbitration panel ordered reinstatement of twelve of the discharged
employees because of disparate enforcement of the policy by Dow.
" TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v, Sup. Ct., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 {Cal. Ct. App.
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access the sites, but they simply "popped up" on his computer.
He sued the employer for wrongful termination, arguing that
the employer's stated reason was pretextuaJ.•
The employer had provided him two computers, one to
keep at work and one to keep at home. During discovery, the
employer demanded production of the home computer with no
deletions or alterations of any information stored on the hard
drive. The plaintiff resisted, contending in part that he had a
state constitutional right of privacy in the information stored
on the computer's hard drive. Unfortunately for the plaintiff,
be had signed the company's "electronic and telephone
equipment policy statement.''" The collrt held that he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in light of his voluntary
waiver.'' The court also discussed that under the "community
norms" of"21" Century computer-dependent businesses," major
employers
monitor, record,
and
review
employee
communications and activities." 'l'he case demonstrates that
even when employers monitor to protect a legitimate interest,
the results of the monitoring can be used as a pretext for an
illegitimate or bad reason for an adverse employment action.''
b. Genetic Discrimination
A second privacy issue is genetic testing" of employees,
and adverse employment actions based on the information
obtained from those tests.'' Llke electronic monitoring, genetic
discrimination" has become possible in the workplace because
2002).

• Id. at 158.
• Under the policy, be •rree<l oot to UH the aystema for penon1I or
noncompany purposes unlu1 axpre11ly Approved. and not to uae them for •improper,
deropt.ory, dcf3matory, Obscene Or bi.her in&pproprfnto purposes." Id, nt 157.
' ' Id. at.164.

" Id.. ot 161~2.
n Kaan. 1upro note 19. at 320 (•Abuse may allo take the form ofvoyeuriam,
union-buaUng, fernting out. whistleblowen, 8nd creaLing pretenaet to fire membera of
prot,cctcd omployec group1.").

•• "Ge..neUc te&Linl(' and "'genetic infonnationtt do not have uniformly acccptM
1ne1ninp in the la.nguqe of the genetic acie.oce1. Feldman & Kati.. 1upro note 20. at
410 nn.18&-89. Most •nacted and propooed 1tatui.. and polici.. indude d<!linitiona.
Commentato·n have distinguished bee.ween genetic .ueening, a one--time tell to
determine whether one hae a genetic prcdi,,position or dle:ease, and genetic monitoring,
involving periodic te.t.11 to increase workplace 111111\lt.y and protoct the health or
emplo)'ff&. /d. al 395-96.
• Stt tf<Mrolfy Feldman & Kall<, 1upro noi. 20.
" Profeuor Kim argues lhot a privacy righll model ofren • better framework
for add:res1ing genetic discrimination t.han the anti·diacrimination model. Kim, 1upta
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of advances in science and technology. It also has been the
subject of proposed legislation at the federal and state levels."
It has not been as pervasive as electronic monitoring because it
is not as cheap and easily available as computer monitoring,
and its reliability is still suspect." However, the financial
incentives to make genetic testing more broadly available
suggest that this type of privacy invasion will increase."
As a general matter, employers' use of tests to invade
the privacy of employees is not new.•• In 1988, Congress all but
banned the use of polygraphs by employers in the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act." Likewise, drug tests are often
challenged under federal" and state constitutions, state drug
testing laws, and common law tort theories." Through statutes
and common law, some states have restricted the use ofpaperand-pencil tests and other types of honesty and psychological
profile tests." However, genetic testing is a uniquely powerful
issue that poses special challenges because of the depth of the
invasion, which reaches into the secrets of one's biological
makeup, and because of the breadth of information that genetic
testing can provide.
The Human Genome Project began in 1990, and within
ten years the once unthinkable bad been accomplished - the
"genetic map" was essentially complete." Now it is possible to
use a piece of hair, a drop of blood or other sliver of genetic
material to obtain extensive genetic information about a
person."' Many good results are likely to flow from this
scientific marvel, as scientists may be able to identify potential
diseases and conditions," and someday perhaps even work with
note 20, at 1502.
" See infra Part U.A.3.b.
" Feldman & Kat., •upra note 20, at 389 & n.3; Kim, aupra note 20, at 1511.
111
Makdisi, ttupro. noto 20, nt 972; Miller, &upra note 20, at 235-37.
80
Wukitach, supra note 20, at 42·43.
" 29 U.S.C. ff 2001-2009 (2000). Although the Act provides for
circumstances under which employers can polygraph employee1:1, the requirements are
so stringent as to make the provisions virtually useless.
" See, e.g., Nat1 Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989).
" See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nab<>ro Al..ka Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Ala.
1989).
5' See ge11eroJly David C. Yamada, The Regulation of Pre·Employmenl

HoM.ty Testing: Striking a Temporary (1) Balance BelWttn Self-Regulation and
ProhibUion, 89 WAYNEL. REY. 1549 (1998).
116

Kim, supra note. 20, at 1497; Makdisi, supra note 20, at 965-66.
"' Makdisi. 3upro note 20, at 965-66.
" See, e.g., Miller, 1upra note 20, at 226.
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those genes to treat or prevent a disease. However, some bad
results may also follow. Employers can and have used new
technology to obtain genetic information about employees.•
There are many reasons why employers may want to perform
tests and obtain genetic information.• Some are rompletely
benign, such as complying with the Occupational Health and
Safety Act, and identifying employees whose health or safety
may be endangered, or who may endanger the health or safety
of others by working in particular jobs or environments ... Yet
other reasons strike at the hea.r t of employees' fears: making
hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and other employment
decisions based on the information."
Specifically, employers would be inclined to take
adverse employment actions, such as refusing to hire, firing, or
denying health care roverage to individuals who tested positive
for certain genes that predisposed one to disease. Incentives
abound for employers to cull and use genetic information, such
as lowering the costs of health care, workers' compensation
costs, lost time under the Family and Medical Leave Act,
accommodations under the American with Disabilities Act, and
training expenses and other investments in employees with
little longevity." The incentives are not merely theoretical there is evidence that such employment discrimination has in
fact occurred.• Quite apart from the invasion of privacy and its
impact on adverse employment decisions, but equally
disconcerting, genetic discrimination also has a side effect that
undercuts employee health. Survey evidence indicates that
employees fear such employment discrimination and would
refuse testing based on those fears, thus foregoing the potential
ben.efits of preventing or decreasing the chance of developing
diseases."

'" s.. Feldman & Kotz, 1upra note 20, at 893 (oxplaininr that the following
three conditions can be determined from gonatlc loaling: (i) person has genetic derect
that ha1 caused or will cause a diaeaae; (ii) penon 11 a canior of disease or genetic
defect; and (ill) porooo h88 predi>po•ilion lO developlnr a dioea1e).
'" &., e.g., Kim, •upra nolO 20, at 11139-42.
• SH Feldman & Katz, •upra not.e 20, at 396·97; Kim, •upra note 20, at
1639-42.
" SH Feldman & Katz, supra nou 20, at 397.
" Id. ot 397·98 (citinJ ...,,., of lh... reuona).
• Miller. 1upro note 20, 11-t 237 (citinc 1urvey or genetic ee:rvices providers
and primaiy bullh care physicians who "'ported lmowlDf 682 people who were denied
employment or inaurance coverage becaUM of !heir aeoolic pndi.apocitiooa).
" Kim, supra note 20, ot IS42-43; M.iller, ••pro note 20, et 233; Wukitsch,
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In the most notorious reported incident of alleged
genetic testing of employees, a group of thirty-six railway
workers employed by Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging that their employer had
genetically tested them without their consent or knowledge."
The employees claimed to have reported to their employer that
they suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. In turn, the
employer required them to submit to a medical examination by
non-company health care providers. Instead of being limited to
an examination for carpal tunnel syndrome, the examination
included a blood test for genetic markers. Consequently, the
EEOC filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act."
The EEOC and the employer ultimately settled the case, with
the employer denying that it had engaged in illegal testing and
agreeing to pay 2.2 million dollars. Prior to settling, the
company agreed to stop genetic testing."
2. Protecting Privacy: Inadequacy of Current Law
One may view the law protecting employee privacy as
consisting of "bits and pieces of legislation and of a melange of
common law categories - rife with silences, doctrinal gaps, and
inconsistencies ... in other words, a mess.- That assessment
stems from the comparative lack of governing principles, such
as those found in German law.• The following two subparts
survey and critique the capacity of extant law to effectively
meet the challenges posed by electronic monitoring and genetic
testing.

1upro note 20. at 40; Feldman & Katz, 1upro note 20, ot 895 & n.56; Hugheo, 1upra

nolo 20, at 36-37.
" EEOC'• First Genetic Teoting Challenge, 1upro note 20; Molly McDonough,
EEOC TUach<• $2.2 Million Settl<m~nt with l!oilrood, 21 ABA J, E·REP. l (2002).
" EEOC v. Burlington N. and Santo Fe Ry. Co., No. 02.C4156 <N.D. Iowa).
" Presa Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportuni\y Commiuion, EEOC
and BNSF Set.tie Genetic Testing Ceso Under Americans with Diaabilitieo Act (May 8,
2002), auoi/able at http://www.eooc.gov/pres815·8·02.html; ace al•o McDonough, aupro
note 95.
• FINKIN,•upro not.e 17, at xxi.
" Id. at u & n_lO (citing IOUJ'CH), The Buie Law of the Fede1'111 Republic of
Q{irmany stat.es that the •secrecy or post and telecommunication are inviolable.'" THE
BASIC LAw (GRUNOOESETZ~ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GJ!:RIMNV art. 10(1) (Axel Tscllentochcr tran•., 2003). For a brief summary of German
law on workph•ce privacy, see Keaao, 8upra note 19, at 309·10.
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a. Electronic Monitoring
Currently, both federal and state laws regulate
electronic monitoring of employees. AIJ an important initial
division, public employees enjoy protection beyond their private
counterparts because public employees have privacy
protections in both the federal and state constitutions.• In only
a single state - California - does the state constitutional right
of privacy extend to private sector employees."' Additionally,
statutory protection is provided by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),"' which amended
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safo Streets Act of
1968,'"' also know as the Federal Wiretap Act.
At the state level, many state statutes more or less
track the ECPA. However, at the time the ECPA was enacted,
Internet and e-mail monitoring were not major issues.
Generally, Title I of the Act"' prohibits the interception of wire,
oral, and electronic communications, while Title II"' prohibit&
accessing stored communications. AIJ promising as those brief
descriptions sound for employees, for many reasons the ECPA
hos proven largely ineffective in addressing the current issues
in computer and electronic monitoring."" Because the state
statutes are modeled on the federal law, most share the federal

,. Wilbom, 1upro note 19, at 886-73; l<ft•n, 1upro note 19, at 294-95; Kim,
1upm note 17, at 703-06.
"' Hill v. Nat1 Coll•,giate Athletic Aa..n, 865 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1994); see al•o
Kc1an, 1upro note 19, at 294 (1toting that 'Callfomla 11 tho only s tate granting

constitutional privacy right.I t.o private 11&ctor workers").
'" Pub. L. No. 99·508, 100 Stat. 1S48 (1986) (codifiod aa amended in scattered
1e<.'tions of 18 U.S.C.).
'"' Pub. L. No. 9().351, 82 Stet. 197, 211-25 (1963) (codifled ••amended at 18
U.S.C., ff 2510.2522 and 47 U.S.C. f 605 (2000)),
"' lS u.s.c. H 2610.2521 <2000>.
* 1s u.s.c. H 2701-2711 <2000>.
* Kesa.n, 1upro note 19. at 295--99; Wilborn, 1upro n0l4 19, at 83Ml;
Robinoon, •upro note 19, at 313·20; Richman, 1upro note 19, at 1349·50; Watson, 1upro
note 19, at 87·88. 0111 obetacle about which the.re ha1 bean 1ome liti.gation is whet.her
the monitoring of e-mail• canatitutes an ''intercepUon• within lhe meaning of the
ECPA. See Robin1an, 1upra note 19, at 314-16. The determinative factor may be
whet.her tlle e-mail is in tron1lt or in storage. Id. at 315. See alao Frayer, supra note 19,
at 866-67 (discussing the few judicial interpretations of"'intercep..-). Even if a plaintiff
i• able to est8blish an interception under a court'& int.erpret.atlon of the term, however,
there are several exceptlon1 that poee formidable hurdl11. Sn. 1.g ., Kesan, supra note
19, at 296-98; Robin10n, •upro note 19, at 316-18. But - Smith v. Devon, 01-T·Ml·N,
2002 WL 75800 CM.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002) (revening summary judpient in favor of the
clefend<ont emplo>"'r on a Fedora) Wiretap Act dalm).

REVITAUZED COMMON LAW OP THE WORKPLACE

2003]

109

statute's limitations regarding protection against computer
monitoring.""
Although often overlooked in debates about computer
monitoring, one federal statute that may provide some
protection is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)."' Most
obviously, it is an unfair labor practice to conduct surveillance
of union activities in a workplace where employees are
represented by a union, or where union organizing is being
conducted."" Thus, if an employer is conducting general
moni tori ng, a.n d employees are discussing union organizing or
other union activities, the employer may have committed an
unfair labor practice in violation of§ 8(aXl) of the NLRA.'"
The lesser-known aspect of the NLRA is that all
employees, whether represented by a union or not, with the
exceptions specifically enumerated in the Act, have the right
under § 7'" to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or mutual aid or protection. "For purposes
of mutual aid or protection" hos been interpreted broadly to
include most matters relating to terms or conditions of
employment."' Thus, monitoring of employees who are
discussing work conditions via e-mail may be an unfair labor
practice. Establishing rules prohibiting such communications
also may constitute an unfair labor practice.'"
Turning to common law, the tort of invasion of privacy
also applies to computer monitoring."' There are four branches
or versions of the tort: intrusion upon seclusion; public
disclosure of private facts; false light; and appropriation of
name or likeness."' The branch relevant in the employment
,., Richmon, rupra not.e 19, at 1350-.62. Counooticut ia an exception, as it
enact.ed a law t.hat. roquirel employen to give emptoyee1 prior written notification or
electronic monltorin1. CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. f 31 -CSdCbXll (Weot2000).
• 29 U.S .C. ff 161-169 (2000). ~rdin1 applicability of the NLRA IO

elecuonic invuiono of privacy, ..., William R. Corbetl, Wailing for IM Labor Law of
1114 fu~nty-Fi,..t C1ntury: Bwrythinl Old I• N•w A1ai11, 23 BERKEUY J . EMP. I< LAB.
L. 269 (2002); Froyer, •upra note 19, at 862-6<1.
,,. l Tl18 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE
NATIONA~ LABOR RELATIONS Acr 127 (Patrick Hardin od., 3d ed. 1992).
" ' 29 U.S.C. I 158(a)(I) (2000).
'" 29 u.s.c. I 157 (2000).

"' See Corbett. aupro note 108, at 282·83.
'~ Id. at 291 -95.
Ketan, aupro note 19, at302--04: Kim, 1upro note 17, at 688-98.
in Kenn. •upro note 1.9, at 802.-0C; Kim, 1upro. note 17, at 688-98:
REsTATE>IENT (8t;COllD) OF '!'ORTS§ 652A (1977); Hl!llRY R. PERl!nT, JR., WORKJ'UCB
114

TORTS: RJG11111I<l..IABIUIIES198 (1991i
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context is intrusion upon seclusion."' The tort's three prima
facie elements are: (1) an intentional invasion or intrusion; (2)
that is highly offensive to a reasonable person; (3) occurring
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.'" On the
whole, employees suing their employers for the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion have fared about as poorly as employees suing
their employers for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED).'"
The weak track record exists for two reasons. First, the
requirement that the intrusion be highly offensive to a
reasonable person prevents trivial privacy invasions from being
actionable."' This element is roughly analogous to the outrage
element in intentional infliction of emotional distress. It seems,
however, that courts have not set the bar as high for "highly
offensive• as they have for "outrageous." An intrusion must be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, whereas for outrage to
be satisfied, the act must be such that civilized society should
not tolerate it. Plaintiffs often plead both llED and invasion of
privacy when complaining of abuse in the workplace. However,
the outrage element is too difficult to satisfy when the act
complained of is electronic monitoring.'"
Most invasion of privacy claims in the employment
context fail because courts find either that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy, or that the invasion would
not be highly offensive to a reasonable person, or both.'"
Attorneys and consultants routinely advise employers to
establish written e-mail and computer use policies, to tell
employees that they can and will be monitored,"' and to have

no Kcsan, supra note 19, at 302; Kim, supra note 17, Bt 688. Prafassor
Makdisi describes the intrusion upon seclusion branch as being more aligned with
dignitary in1Jult, whereaa the other three are aligned with property-like elienation
issues. Ma.kdisi, aupra note 20, at 983.
'" 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE I.Aw OF TORTS§ 426, at 1200 (2001).
1
~ See ge1utraUy Kim, &upro note 17.
Ht Su PERRl1T, supro note 115, at 204.05; Kim, supra note 17, at 691-92;
Kesan, 1upra note 19, at 302-03.
•• ~san, 1upra note 19, at 302; see a/$0 Smith v. Devers, Ol·T·55l· N, 2002
WL 75803 <M.O. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002) (reversing summary judgment in favor of the
defendant employer on invasion of privacy claim, but affirming on llED claim).
111
The line between the two elements is indistinct, and courts: oft.en ble.nd
them int.o one in their analysis. Kesan, aupra note 19, at 302; se.e olso PERRJTI', 1upro
note 115, at 203-04.
111
Stt, e.g., Spencer, supra. note 56, at 870 (Lawye.ra "routinely advisa their
clients to deny employees any expectation of privacy."); Focus On. . . . Employtt Priuacy,
lNDMDUAI. EMPL. RIGHTS (BNA), Aug. 6, 2002 (No. 18), at 72 (diS<:Ussing
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employees sign an acknowledgment regarding the policy.'"
Nevertheless, even without such policies, courts often find that
the employees cannot have a reasonable expectation of much
privacy in the workplace.'" Perhaps the most extreme example
is in Smyth u. Pillsbury Co.,"' in which the court rejected the
plaintifl's privacy expectation even though the employer had
assured employees that it would not monitor e-mail and use
information obtained to discipline or fire employees.'"
Moreover, even if courts conclude that an employee has or may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, they still may hold
that tho intrusion is not highly offensive because the
employer's interests outweigh the employee's privacy rights.'"
A second problem with the intrusion tort is the Catch-22
that occurs when employers attempt to invade a zono of
privacy. If the employee blocks the invasion, then the employee
often is fired and cannot successfully sue because no privacy
invasion occurred.''" Alternatively, if the employee permits the
intrusion to occur, a claim for invasion of privacy often fails on
the rationa le that the employee consented to the intrusion.'"
Commentators generally have concluded that ex:isti ng
law is inadequate to address abusive electronic monitoring in
the workplace. One scholar summarized his review of the
federa1 and state law by saying that law in the United States
attomeyllpe1ker'1 •dvlce to human rftOUrtt man•cera to Cuhioo and oommun.lclte a
dear policy thftl ·r... rv(..J lhe right IO ..an:h and d..1rey any reuonable upecllllon
of privacy" ). Stt allO Oarri1y v. John Hancock Mut. Lire Ina. Co., 2002 WL 9'14676 (0 .
Mft81. May 7, 2002).
iu Kc8nn, 11iprn not.c 19, aLS04~0l5 ("AL con1mon J3w, then, an employor n1ay
insulate ltaolr lrom liobility by inrormint; omploycee of n monitoring program.'">.
•~• Id, nl 305; \Vilborn, ""pro note 10, Al 846 (Tor example. an employee'•
offioe, desk, or lockor may be held to be tho omploy•r'• proporty and thu1, not
private."). Stt a/IJO M•kdioi, supra nou. 20, at 993·1002 (writing about application or
intnasion upon IOUl.ude to genetic telting and recommending a.broptJon of •
mechanical applicalloo of the "public placeo rule"- courta gn.nt aummary judpent In
....., In which lho all.,..t intrusioo oc:cumicl In a public place, on the ntionale that
there can be DO Oll~lion or privacy in a public place),
,.. 914 F. Supp. 97 CE.D. Pa. 1996).
1
Id. at. 101 ('"(W)e do not find a reuonablo expectation or privacy in e~ma.il
•

communication• voluntarily made by an employee to his eupervisor over the company
e·mail sysW1u not.withstanding any assura.ncea thal 1uch communications would nol be
in~rcoptcd by mnnngemenl.").
01
Ser, ~.g.• Garrity, 2 002 WL 974676, at •2. (•Even if plaintiffs hnvo n
reasonable cxpcc:t.ation or privacy in the.ir work e-mail, defendant's legitimate bu1ine11
intereet in prot.ec:tJng its employees from hara11ment in the workplace would likely
trump plaintiff•' privacy inU!resu.").
'" Stt, 41., Luedlke v. Nabors Alaaka Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaaka
1989); Kim, 1upro note 17, at 675-76.
"" Stt. •4.. Liredtlu, 168 P.2d 1123; Kim, wpro note 17, ot 676.
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does not protect "a zone of privacy in the workplace.""'
Although that conclusion seems too severe, if he means there is
no absolute right of privacy that will prevail regardless of the
interests the employer throws onto the scales, then it is
certainly true that the zone is minuscule. Indeed, the legal
approach in the United States has been to individually address
each method or device used to invade privacy rather than
trying to protect a zone of privacy against invasion by all
means or devices.uo The only general source of privacy
protection for most employees in the private sector is the
common law."'
b. Genetic Discrimination
As with electronic monitoring and other privacy issues,
public employees can state claims for invasion of privacy under
the Constitution, although the Supreme Court has not yet
decided a case involving an individual's privacy interest in her
genetic information."' There is no federal legislation that
explicitly prohibits genetic testing of employees or
discrimination against them on the basis of information
obtained by such testing."" There is a federal statute, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HlPAA),.. which generally prohibits group health insurance
plans from using genetic information to make rules regarding
initial eligibility or continued eligibility for coverage.••
However, while relevant to the employment setting because
most employees have health coverage through their
employers,"' HIPAA does not prohibit employers from
requesting or requiring employees to submit to genetic testing,
or from discriminating in employment on the basis of genetic
information.
Also at the federal level, President Clinton issued
Executive Order Number 13,145, entitled "To Prohibit

m Kesan, 1upro note 19, at 322.
'" Kim, aupro nol.e 17, at 674.
'" Id. aL675.
"' llliller, aupra nol.e 20, at 251·52.
"'Id. at237.
"' Pub. L. No. 104- 191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in
ocatlered oecliona or lS U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.l.
"' llliller, wpro DOie 20, at 255; Feldman & Katz, 1uprv note 20, at 400-07.
m S.,. Kim, IUpt'O DOie 20, at 1502.
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Discrimination in Federal Employment Based on Genetic
Information."'" The Executive Order prohibits discrimination
based on protected genetic information in all civilian federal
government employment."' The
Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also has interpreted the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to prohibit genetic
discrimination... As recounted above, tho EEOC has settled the
one case in which it filed suit for genetic discrimination under
the ADA."' The crux of the EEOC interpretation is that genetic
defects and predisposition to diseases or conditions can be
covered under the "regarded as" prong of the definition of
"disability."'" Whether courts will defer to the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA remains to be seen."' Title VT1 may
also be invoked in a case of genetic discrimination if a case can
be made under the disparate impact theory, but that depends
on establishing a high correlation between the incidence of a
particular genetic marker or predisposition, and a protected
class under Title VU.'"
At the state level, thirty-one states hove enacted one or
more statutes addressing genetic testing and its uses in the
workplace."' Thero is a wide variety among the statutes in the
extent to which they restrict employers from requesting or
requiring genetic testing nod using such information to make
employment decisions.'•
As with electronic monitoring, the tort theory of
invasion of privacy may also be applied to genetic testing.
Although there are no reported decisions of this type, the
theory has been applied to drug and other types of testing, and

'"' Exec. Order No. 13, 146, 6S Fed. R•i· 8,877 (t'cb. 8, 2000).
•• Miiier, 1upro not.o 20, aL 249.
•• Id. aL 238-47 (c:it.lnf 2 U.S. EEOC, COMPLIANCB MANV.U... Order 916.002,
at 90245 (1995)~
9W'T and
~
•• lohll4r, aupro note20,ot23847; Kim, 1upra noc.a20, at 1514.
'" MJllA!r, 1upro note 20, al 241 (llalln1 that "I.be £EOC"1 lntorpntive
Guidance can be u11ed •• per1u11ive authority" but "the guidance doet not have the
same force O( hlW 81 A roderal 1tatut.a Of regulation'"),
14
• Khn, 1upra note 20, nt 1613; Miller, 1upro note 20, at 247..8: Feldman &
Kau, 1upra note 20, •L 404-05.
0
' Sa
Nat1 Human Genome Ree. lnlt., Report on Employment
Discrimination Stole Legitlltion, al http://www. nhfri.nih.gov/Po!icy_aod_public_
alfain/Legi1lolionlworltplace.htm (Ian visi~ AUJ. 3, 2003) !hereinafter NHCRI
Website).
•• Set, •41 .. MiUer, 1upro note 20, at U9'63 lowveying aute lqialation);
Feldman & Kall, 1upra note 20, ol410.16 (same~

... s.. ••pTO .......

_.,.ti)'!..
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should fare at least as well with genetic testing.'" Indeed, at
least one commentator's survey of the intrusion upon seclusion
cases imbues her with optimism regarding the flexibility of the
intrusion tort and its application to genetic testing."' Another,
while not specifically calling for a common law tort response,
argues that genetic discrimination should be treated as an
issue of protecting employee privacy.••
In sum, there is existing statutory and common law that
applies to both of these emerging types of workplace privacy
invasion. On balance, however, many commentators deem this
law inadequate to address the problems. With respect to
statutes, only the recently enacted state statutes on genetic
testing and discrimination expressly refer to one of these types
of invasions. For all of the other statutes, courts may interpret
them as applicable to these invasions or they may not.
As for the tort theories, principally invasion of privacy,
the inadequacy stems from courts generally favoring
employers' interests over employees' privacy interests, and
consequently skewing the tort doctrine and analysis in favor of
employers. Given the dearth of protection afforded employees
by existing law in the face of scientific and technological
developments that can penetrate deeply into areas of employee
privacy, it was predictable that commentators and employee
rights advocates would propose new law. Given the history of
employment law in this country, it also is not surprising that
most have favored new legislation rather than adjustments to
existing common law.

"' Maltdl1l, 1upro oote 2.0, ot 1002-12. Althouih noL an •mplo,nil'Dt cue, the
•p.,UC.tion of the lnu1ion or privoey I.oft LO dand..tlne cenetlc totting ucse in Doe v.
Hieb·Tech lnlL, Inc., 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. CL App. 1998). ln lhat case, a atudent rave
• blood sample for a rubeU• lftt, ond lhe aample a.loo WH tfftod ror HIV without hi•
knowledge or conaent. '"-• court characterized pla.intirrs Intrusion upon seclu.1ion
claim aa ~mprope.r appropriation of private information reeulting from the HIV teet
t.hat waa performed without hla knowledge or coo1ent.." Id. at 1066. Fi.nding a privacy
interest in a person'• blood aa.mp1e and the information thnt may be gleaned from it,
the court went on to hold that tho unauthorized test.inr would be found by a reasonable
person to be highly oO'en•l•e. ld. at 1071.
141
Makdiai, 1upl'O note 20, at 1019 C'"IT)h& intrusion tort is a viable mean.a of
pm1erving privacy rirhta. i.n a variety of cont.ext.a and . . . it ha1 been enlarged U>
coolider mono apodalired ..tqories of intruaiona, induding auual baraument ond
drur testing In the omployment eootext.").
,. Kim, •upl'O note 20, at 1551.

2003)

REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

115

3. Protecting Privacy: Proposals
a. Electronic Monitoring
Legislation has been introduced at the federal and state
levels to regulate electronic monitoring of employees. The
general thrust of proposed legislation has been not to restrict
monitoring to specific circumstances (such as when an
employer has a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing), but
instead to require employers to give notice to employees of
their monitoring practices. The first legislation proposed st the
federal level was the ill-fated Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act (PCWA).'" It was principally, but not exclusively,
a notice bill."' Despite being approved by a House
subcommittee,'" the bill died what one commentator termed a
"mysterious death" in committee.'"
The progeny of the PCWA rose up in 2000 with the
introduction in Congress of the Notice of Electronic Monitoring
Act (NEMA).'" NEMA was less a.mbitious and even less
restrictive than the PCWA - a "lean and mean" notice bill.'" It
did not prohibit any kind of monitoring, but required notice
when an employee begins employment and then annual
renotification.'" The notice had to cover the following: the form
of communication or computer use to be monitored; how the
monitoring would be done; the kinds of information that would
be obtained; the frequency of monitoring; and how the gathered
information would be used.'" Size and attitude of the lean and
mean bill notwithstanding, NEMA, like its progenitor, died in
Congress, the victim oflobbying by business interests.'"
"' H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993). The bills were
introduced in the 1989-90 term and in subsequent terma, but no hearinp were held.
\Vilbom, supro noto 191 at 849 n.94.
'"' Wilborn, supro note 19, at 849-50~ Fr-ayer, aupra note 19, at 869.
151
Labor Subpanel Approves Mea1ure to Curt0-il Electronic Moni.toring, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNAJ, Feb. 24, 1994 (No. 36), at Dl4.
i iu Frayer, Bllpra note 19, at 868; see also Wilborn, supra note 19, at 851 n.105
(noting the committeee in which the bills stalled and died).
•M aR. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000). For detailed discussion• of the bill, see

Watson. supra note 19, and Frayer, 1upra note 19.
>»Frayer.supra note 19, at.869.
tM Id. at 870; Watson, supra note 19 1 at 93.

"' H.R. 4908, 106th Cong.§ 27U(b)(lH4J (2001).
1
~ Business Coalition Bl.ocks !tfarkup of Bill Requiring Electronic MonUoring
Notification, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNAJ, Sept. 15, 2000 (No. 180), at A9; Frayer, supra
note 19, at 871.
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State legislation to require notice has also been
proposed. In 2001, for the third consecutive year, the California
legislature passed an electronic monitoring notice bill,'" and for
the third time in three years Democratic Governor Gray Davis
vetoed the bill.'" The bill would have required employers to
notify employees either in writing or electronically of the
employer's workplace privacy and electronic monitoring policies
and practices."' Governor Davis, in the message accompanying
bis veto, recognized the legitimate need for employers to
monitor and stated, ''This bill places unnecessary and
complicating obligations on employers and may lead to
litigation by affected employees over whether the required
notice was provided and whether it was read and understood
by the employee.""'
Some commentators favor a legislative approach to
electronic monitoring, while others favor a notice law such as
NEMA."' Professor S. Elizabeth Wilborn, for example, favors a
legislative solution, but does not think that the PCWA did
enough because it was primarily a notice bill that would not
have restricted the amount or scope of monitoring.'" She favors
comprehensive federal legislation that expressly states that
employees have reasonable expectations of privacy in the
workplace, requires employers to demonstrate a legitimate
business interest in order to justify monitoring, requires
employers who satisfy that burden to use the least intrusive
means of monitoring available, and creates incentives for
employers to use content-neutral monitoring techniques."'
Another commentator favors, as part of larger privacy reforms,
federal privacy legislatiorl that limits the circumstances under
which employers could electronically monitor, and prohibits

"' S . 147, 107th Cong. (2001).
0
"
Priuacy Bi.U for En1ployee E-A1ail Vetoed for Third Time by Cal-ifor11ia. Gou.
Davi•, DAILY !..AB. REP. <BNA), Oct. 11, 2001 (No. 195) !hereinafter Privacy Bill for
Employee E-!tfCJitJ. See ge11~rally Keaan, supra note 19 (discussing state and federal law
applicable to electronic monitoring).
"' S.147, 107th Cong. (2001).
141
Privacy BiJl for Employee E-J\fail, 1u1.pra. note 160.
Frayer, 1upro note 19, at874 (recommending p.a.saage ofNE?.W• Richman,
•upra note 19, at 1361 (..A s tatute like the PCWA would a.end a strong message to
employers and employee& about liability for harms created by workers and the right to
workplace privacy . . . ."')i WaUJon, supra note 19, at 101 (stating that NEMA
represented a "'significant compromise by both sides in the debate•) .
... Wilborn, supro note 19, at 851.
,., Id. at 880-81.
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employment policies and agreements in which employees agree
to such monitoring."'
Most commentators hold out little hope for state
legislative solutions for reasons such as business groups'
lobbying and the ill fit between law limited by state boundaries
and technology that realizes boundariless co=unication."' At
least one commentator has suggested that a federal notice law
that provides little privacy protection could provide impetus for
passage of more protective state legislation."'
Other commentators favor using the common law to
address monitoring. One possibility is a tort approach that
recognizes a public policy of employees' privacy rights in the
workplace, end uses the tort theory of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy to limit the employment-at-will
doctrine... Another proposal is a contract approach
incorporating principles that permit employers and employees
to achieve their legitimate expectations in monitoring and
privacy, respectively.'"
b. Genetic Discrimination
There are numerous calls for federal legislation on
genetic discrimination, many by emending Title VIT or the
ADA.'" The Clinton administration, for example, called for
federal legislation banning genetic testing in employment.'"
Even the former Commissioner of the EEOC, Paul Miller, said
that "additional legislation may be needed," notwithstanding
the EEOC's position that the ADA covers genetic
discrimination."' Several bills on genetic testing and genetic
discrimination in insurance and employment have been

•

Spencer, 1upro note 66. at 912.

.., Kaan, eupro note 19, et 301--02; Wilborn, eupro note 19, aL 842-43.
,. Frayer, eupro note 19, at S74 (recommendin1 pauage or NEMA, "which
would serve u tho foundation and in&pinat.ion ror more exP1tn.1ive st.ate and federal
legisltttion in the future•).
1
Kim, 1upro note 17, at 720·29.
•
1 11
' Kcton, 1111pro note 19, at 322· 32.

'" Feldman & Kotz, •upro note 20; Brion M. Holt, Comment, O.neli<:alcy
Ikftctive: The Judicial ln1erpretation of tlJe Amtrica.n1 with Diso.bililit1 Act FaU• to
Prollet Agairut 0.n•fiJ: IA.crimination in the Wor•plooe , 35 J . MARSRAU. L . REV. ~57
(2002); WuklLICh, eupro note 20.
111
Miller. 1.u.pro note 20, a t 264.
m M.iUer. 1upro note 20, at 265.
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introduced since 1997.'" In the most recent session of Congress,
although the Bush administration announced it supported
genetic discrimination legislation,"' the bills bogged down in
House and Senate committees under questions of overlap with
the ADA, HIPAA, and other laws.'"
One commentator, addressing genetic privacy beyond
the employment context, viewed the tort theory of invasion of
privacy, primarily the intrusion upon seclusion branch, as
adequate to address the problems if the theory were tweaked.'"
While not specifying whether she favors a legislative or
common law approach, Professor Pauline Kim argues that
genetic intrusion is better addressed under a privacy rights
model than an anti-discrimination model.'" In discussing a
number of the issues under a privacy rights model, Kim did not
create a template for legislation.'" Kim, who also has written
about electronic monitoring, favored a common law approach to
that invasion of privacy issue,'"' because it involves balancing of
interests and is thus ill-suited to a statutory approach.
Most proposals for new law to address electronic
monitoring and genetic testing and discrimination have been
legislative approaches. The principal weakness of this approach
is that it does not recognize that statutes lack the flexibility
required to balan.ce the interests of employers and employees in
matters of privacy. General or specific prohibitions can be
articulated in statutes, but such unqualified prohibitions are
not necessary or desirable in this area. By and large,
commentators and law reformers have selected a tool too blunt
for this delicate job, which requires calibrating that can only be
achieved through the common law.

'" Id.; Feldman & Katz., supra note 20, ot 409.
See Dernocrat.a ~Velcome Buslt., StaJen1ent on Genetic Discriniin.(Jtion
Legi•lation, DAILY LAB. REP. (8NA), June 26, 2001(No.122), ot A8.
115
Stn. Kenn.ttly to Addresa Genetic 8iC18 Bil1'11 Overlap of ADA, PrilJtlty
&gulationB, DAILY LAB. R£P. (8NAl, July 26, 2001 (No. 143), at Al; Overlap in Genetic
Bicu Le.gi$lC1tion 11 Examined i.n House H~ori,,g o" BiU, DAILY W. REP. (BNA), July
12, 2001 (No. 133), at A8.
1
"

111

11.takdisi, 1upra note 20, at 97S..79 (''As in many other areas where
statutory protections are inadequate to guard against a perceived harm, the viability of
common law actions for intrusion upon genet-ic privacy is critical.").
111
Kim, supra note 20, at 1551.
119
Id. at 1543.
1JO See supra notes 16S..70 and accompanying text..
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Bullying

1. Bullying: Definition and Examples
Workplace bullying may be the "corporate buzzword for
tho new millennium, pushing sexual harassment from its
perch.""' The problem has virtually spawned an industry of its
own. There are organizations that maintain websites, conduct
conferences, and sponsor legislation to eradicate workplace
harassment.... There are companies that will perform audits,
identify bullying in workplaces, and attempt to eliminate it."'
Reports of workplace abuse are legion, ranging from the
insensitive to the utterly inhumane. A recent cause oolllbre is
by no means the worst case, but it does demonstrate the
senseless workplace meanness often perpetrated by the
powerful upon the powerless. According to the complaint of
Jodee Berry, a waitress at a Hooters restaurant in Panama
City, Florida, management announced that the waitress who
sold the most beer in a month would win a Toyota.'" When Ms.
Berry sold the most beer, she was blindfolded and taken out to
the restaurant's parking lot, where she expected to be
presented with her new car. Instead, when the blindfold was
removed, she saw a toy Yoda doll (the Jedi Master from tho
Star Wars movies). She quit and sued for breach of contract
and fraud. Although the restaurant manager contended that
the contest was an April Fools' Day joke, the corporate owner of
the restaurant settled the case, agreeing to give Ms. Berry a
new car...
A case in Texas, GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, .. has
garnered considerable attention and been published in some
caae books as an exemplar of the tort of intentional infliction of

Karlak, Bllpra note 16.
In the United States, there la The \Vorkpla.ce Bullying & Trauma lnatitut.e
(formerly the Campaign Againat Workplace Bullyinc). See 1upro note 16. In the United
t•i

•.t:t

Kingdom, there is a UK National Workplace Bullying Advice Line. S« Bully OnL!ne
Webeite,al http://www.bullyonline.orlfworkbully/index.htm <laat visit.id Aug. I, 2003i
,.., See Karlak. 1upro note 18. Envisionworb is such a company. Sn
Enviaionworb Wehaite, at http://www.envlaionworb.net Oa.sted visited Aurust 9,

2003).
,.. Asoocioted Press, Juq• Soys Woitnn Can Sw HOOlua in "Toy-Yoda"
Ca•, S. FIA SUN.SU."111'El., Oct. 14, 2001, at 88.
,. Stt. e.g., Bz·HOOl<rs Wait,..., Scttln Suit, TllE SrATE (Columbia. S.C.l,
May 10, 2002, al. 9; Whal a HOOi, FIH. TIMBS, May 10, 2002, at P13.
.. 99S S.W.2d 605 (Te.t. 1999).
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emotional distress."' The case involved a male supervisor who
managed a small office. Three employees sued for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because the supervisor engaged
in frequent profanity-laced tirades,"' required employees to
perform redundant janitorial chores, had employees stand
before him for extended periods while he stared at them, and
frequently threatened employees with termination.'" Perhaps
most memorably, this "bull" of a supervisor would lower his
head, straighten his arms by his sides and ball up his fists, and
lunge at employees, stopping just short of making contact with
their faces as he screamed at them.'..
The 'l'exas Supreme Court embraces a strong version of
the employment-at-will doctrine, and in employment settings
the court has been loath to recognize tort theories,"' including
intentiona.I infliction of emotional distress."' Indeed, the court
in GTE Southwest stated that because many aspects of
managing a business are unpleasant for employees, Texas
courts "have adopted a strict approach to intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims arising in the workplace.""' But the
conduct of the supervisor in this case was so severe and
occurred so regularly that even the Texas Supreme Court
concluded it should not be expected in the workplace or
tolerated in a civilized society.'"
2. Bully Busting: Inadequacy of Current Law
There exist only two types of law that address
harassment or abuse in the workplace. The first type is the
harassment theories under Title VII and the other employment
anti-discrimination laws. Tbe second type is tort law, primarily

'" s...

e.g., DAN B . DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, T0R'1'S ANO C0Ml'l!N$A'l'ION:
PERSOSALACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSlUlLlTY ''OR INJURY 498 (4" ed. 2001).
1111
Tho ..F word" and the -MF word" apparently were t\vO of his favorites.
When one employee asked him to .stop because it was offensive, he got in D·ont of her
face and screamed, •1 will do and aay any damn thing I want.• GTE Southwell, 998

S.W.2d at 613.

'" Id. at 613·14.
IPO Id.
1111
Texas recognites a narrow version of the tort of wrongful discharg~ in
violet.ion of public policy. See S.bine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.
1985); Johnson v. Del Mar Distributing Co., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
1111
Gergen, supra note 28, at 1702 (stating that aside from cases involving
sexual harassment, employl?&.& rarely succeed on IlED claims).

" ' GTE Southwest, 998 S.W.2d at612.
ilk

Id. at 617.
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the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Commentators have argued that the two types of law provide
inadequate protection.'"
Regardi ng harassment law, the limitation on coverage
of abusive conduct in the workplace is obvious. One who cannot
prove that abusive conduct is because of sex, or race, or some
other protected characteristic cannot recover, no matter how
bad the conduct. This limitation is even more severe than it
appears at first blush. When harassment is because of a
protected characteristic has been a much-litigated issue.'" The
result has been that in many cases involving sexual conduct,
the plaintiff cannot recover becauso a court reasons that the
because-of-sex requirement is not satisfied.
The Supreme Court addressed a because-of-sex issue in
Oncale u. Sundow11er Of{slwre Seru11., Inc .... In that case, the
Court held that a claim does not fail to satisfy the requirement
simply because it is same-sex sexual harassment. The Court
did note, however, that the requirement is harder to satisfy in
such cases. 'fbo Court's opinion a.lso includes statements that
appellate courts have relied upon to deny recovery in a number
of subsequent sexual (and other) harassment cases. Rajecting
the argument that it was transforming Title VII into "a general
civility code for the American workplace."'" the Court stated
that w[t)he critical issue ... is whether membe.rs of one sex are
exposed to disadvanta.geous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed.M•
AB for tort law, plaintiffs have prevailed on IIED claims
in workplace settings in only a small percentage of cases."'
Courts often dispose of the cases on summary judgment,
'" Sn Infra Pen ll.8.2.
,. Sn, 14.. David S. Schwartz, \Vh•n I• Su
of Sur Tht Cau.oollon
Probhm in Suual llaroument Law, 150 U. PA. L. REY. 1697 12002).
'"' 623 U.S. 16 09981.

s.co....

"'Id. 1180.
"' Id. (quoting Hanis v. ForkliJI. s,.., Inc., 510 U.S. 11, 25 (1993) (Glnaburg,
J., concurring)). Profcuor David Schwart& crit.icir.c1 the Oneok decision for it.1 ~ection
of the ..,ex per .c" 8hort.cut to proving "because of sex." Schwartz, 11upra note 196, at
1703, 1728-48. By thi• he means that •sexual conduct in the workplace is nlweyo,
without. more, 'bocousc of sex."' Id. at 1705.
mo PERRITT, supra note 115, at 265, 268·76; Regina Austin, Etnployer Abu11e,
Worker Re1i1tanot, and the Tort TMory of l nltntional l n{Uction of Emotional Di1tre11,
41 STAN. L. R£v. I, 6.S (1998); Gergen, 1upm note 28, at 1102 l"lle•pite the apparent
openneu or the tort, inOiction claims by employ"" "'"'ly 1.-ed."); Ehttnntich, 1upra
note 23. at 66-66; Sum.me.rs, supra note 24, ac. 74 (-Su.ha for intentional inlUction of
emotional dialftu are aeldom sua:essful.").
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finding that the high threshold of "outrageous" conduct (so bad
that civilized society should not tolerate it) is not met. The
most successful type of IIED case typically involves sexual
harassment.•• The most likely reason for courts' reluctance to
permit recovery on IIED claims for workplace abuse is their
concern that the tort theory will become a way to circumvent
the employment-at-will doctrine, thus serving as a stealthy
wrongful discharge claim.•
Other tort theories, such as battery and false
imprisonment,.. have applied to some cases of workplace
abuse, but they do not apply to general abusive conduct."' In
cases of sexual harassment,.. plaintiffs hove also successfully
used the tort theory of invasion of privacy (intrusion upon
seclusion branch).• In some cases involving abusive discharge,
plaintiffs have also used the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy, but most stat.es require identification
of a definite public policy,"' as well as harm to society at large not just to the individual - that will follow from not imposing
liability for the discharge ...
Many commentators thus deem current law inadequate
to protect against workplace bullying. Harassment theory
under employment anti-discrimination law is too narrow in its
"because of" requirement. As for tort law, plaintiffs
infrequently prevail on IIED claims because one of its elements

Gercen, •upro. no~ 28, at 1102·; Denni• P. Our'fy. lnt1ntion.ol lnflicti0tt of
EmotionCJ-1. Di•tre11 and Employm1u1t at Will: Tht Co•e J\/Jain1t ·Tortifi.ca.tion• of Labor
a11d Empkzyment Low, 74 B.U. L. RBV. 387, 404 (1994). SH, e.g ., Hoffman·LaRocho,
Inc. v. Z.ltwangor, 69 $.W.&l 634 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding that oexual haraaamont
1

•

eonatituted outraieoua conduct and a!Ilrming $10 million judgn1ent for employee,
including $8 million in axemplary damageo), review 11romtd, 2002 Tax. LEXIS 181
(T•L Oct.. 31. 2002),
,. S"-o ~.... Aullin, 1upro note 200, at 9 (""l'be cowu are particula-rly wary or
attempq to use (llEDJ to evade I.be rules sanctioning tho aummary d:it<Mrge or ai.wlll
employMs."); Dulfy, '"""'now 201, at 396.
- &. Ebrtnrtlcb, 1upro note 23, at 22•
... &.. •.g., Mlrallalr.bari v. Penolcoolte, 1561 S .E.2d 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)

(dlamissing claim ror- ralte imprisonment).
"" See. e.g., Phillipe v. Smalley Maintenance Serva., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala.
19831; Ott alao Ma.kdlal, 111pra note 20, at 1006·07.

*

See 1upro not.ct 114--29 and accompanying t.er:t for a fuller discussion

or

thia tort theory.

,.. Stt, e.g., Groen v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp, 798 (E .D. Pa. 1995~ Gardner v,
Leomi& Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996).

• Ser cues cited •upro note 207; PER.Rn'T, 1upro not.e US, at ch. 3; Parker,
IJqH'U note 2.3, at 392-4()2,
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problem

3. Bully Busting: Proposals
Among academic commentators calling for legal
responses to workplace abuse and harassment,"" one writes
that "no one has attempted systematically to define when
workplace humiliation should be actionable.~, .. Professor David
Yamada and the Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute have
been at the vanguard of efforts to fashion new statutory law to
prohibit workplace bullying."' Indeed, the Institute reports that
in 2003, California will become the first state in which the
proposed legislation is introduced in the state legislature.m The
proposed legislation, designed for enactment at the state or
federal level, would create a cause of action called "intentional
infliction of a hostile work environment."m Essentially,
Professor Yamada uses tho elements of a hostile work
environment harassment claim under Title VII,"' including the
Ellerthl Faragher affirmative defense if the harassment docs
not culminate in a "ta.ngible employment action.""' Thus, what
• SH, ~.... Yamad•, 1upro note 16~ Pi1k 1upro note 18: Ehrenretch, 1upra
not.e 23; Austin, 1upra note 200.
'I•• Fist, IUprG 00&.e 16, Al 73.,
1

, .. S8 1upra DGUI 16.
•n Stt The Worltpl... Bul4'1nc It Trauma Institute Weboite, '""'° nOCAI 18.
'" Yamada,'""'° note 18, al 624°28.
'" Alt.hough eexual baraumenl 11w 5- the best known type or harN1meot

Jaw, hoatile work environment claim• are rococnl&ed on an bases covered by Title vn,
.. well H the ADEA and tho ADA

•l• Ye.msda, 1upra note 16, o.l 624. Yamada defines tho statutory theory of
int.ent.ional inflict.ion of it hostile work onvi.ronment Lhi1 way:
In order «> prove int.cutJonaJ jnfllctlon or a hostile work environment, the
plaintiff must establish by n preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant employer, Ito ogont, or both, lntonUonally aubjected the plainUJTto
ll hostUe work environment. A hoetHo work environment is one th.al ie
deemed hostile by both tho plaintiff and by a reaaonable per•on In the
plaintiff's situation. Emp1oyen a.re to bo held vicariously liable for hOILUe

work environment& i.ntenUonaUy created by their agenta.

Id.
'nlO prima (acie caUM of octlon oulllned Immediately above ~ employen

atrictly liable for the abu•ive behavior or lheir employea. Th.is alone providee
employen with a strong incentive to preve:nt workplace bullying. However,
the law also ahould reward proecdve 111empt.1 to prevent bullying and to
effectively address allegaliooa lhal bullying hH OC>CUITed. Aa:onlingly, under
this proposed lepl ITameworlt, when an employer b sued for the acu of an
8&"11 lhat allegedly cruted a hotlile work •nvironment, it shall be an
affirmative defeme for the employer only if:
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he advocates is "status-blind hostile work environment"
legislation."'
Professor Rosa Ehrenreich has offered a different
approach to workplace harassment."' She argues for a
pluralistic approach to harassment in which adjusted tort law
theories, principally IIED, augment sexual harassment and
other harassment theories under the anti-discrimination laws.
Although the focus of her proposal is a fuller understanding
and treatment of sexual harassment in the law, her proposal
would also benefit those who suffer abuse but cannot recover
under the anti-discrimination laws.'"
Among the proposals for new law to address statusneutral workplace harassment, those invoking new statutes
are misguided. Harassment and abuse are concepts that are too
amorphous to be prohibited by statute. Any statute would say,
in effect, "Don't be mean." Although the principle is laudatory,
this clearly is a misuse of legislation as a regulatory
mechanism, as it would provide no guidance whatsoever.
Moreover, since it would likely be so vague, the statute would
not alter the case-by-case adjudication that takes place now
under the common law protections. It would thus be ineffective
and superfluous. By contrast, adjusting common law tort
theories would fine-tune the law and harmonize it with societal
needs on a case-by-case basis, as well as avoid adding
unnecessary law to an already crowded legislative field.
Ill. THE PATCHWORK OF EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES

Making the case for common law rather than legislative
approaches to workplace problems requires an overview of the
current state of labor and employment law in the United
States, and a brief history of the development of that law. This
section devotes considerable attention to the employment-atwill doctrine because of its pervasiveness and centrality in U.S.
{a) the employer exerciaed rea'Jonab1e care Lo prevent and cort'ect

promptly any l\Ctionable behavior; and,
(b) the plaintiff employee unrea•onably railed to take advantage of
any preventive or cotteelive opportunities provided by the employer
or to svoid ha.rm otherwise.
Id. at527.
""Id. at523.
m Eh.ttnreich. 1uptu note 23.
Id. at 61.

1t1
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employmont law. Furthermore, the power and prerogative
vested in employers under employmont at will have so skewed
common law analysis by courts that it is not surprising that
employee rights advocates have littlo confidence in the common
law and instead favor employment legislation. Still, as this
section explains, the history of American employment law
provides good reasons to agitate for a reinvigorated common
law of the workplace.
A.

Employment at Will

The beginning point for assessing U.S. employment law
is the employment-at-will doctrino.'" lt is the hallmark of labor
and employment law in the United States, serving as the
default rule,. in most states for over a century.•• The most oft;.
quoted statement of the doctrine is that absent an agreement
to the contrary, employers can fire employees for a good reason,
a bad reason or no reason at alt.• Despite the dubious
proposition that someone can do something for no reason at all,
the now famous, or infamous, iteration of employment at will
encapsulates the absolute powor of omployers to govern the
workplace. Although employment at will oxpressly addresses
employers' absolute right to terminate employees, it is about
much more. One who has the power to terminate also has the
power to do as she pleases with respect to all terms and
conditions of employment... At its core, employment at will is
about employer power and prerogative...

nt Sun11ncrM,

1111pra

note 24, at 66 ("To underatand the Am.,ric11n t1y11t.e1n,

therefore, it i.!I noc(!iQary t.o understand Lho doctrine of employment nt will, ill
fundamc.nt.o.1 •uumptions. and it& ambivalenc;e. Mort1 importantly. it ie nece11ary to
recognize where that fundament-1 asaumption ha11haped our labor law.•).
"'" Stt, <4.. C- R. Suru;tein, Swit<hin.<t the IA(oult Rule, 77 N.Y.U. I... RllV.
106 (2002).
•• ProfMIOr And·~ Morri.&s hu atudied the timing of 5t8.t.es' adopUon of
employ~l AL w;JJ. Andrew Moniu, Erplod1n1 M,tM: An Empirical ond &onomk
~smeni of th• Ri.. of Emp/eyment AJ.Wil/, 69 MO. I... REV. 679, 681-82 (1994). In
1851 Ma.ina waa the nm state to adopt the rule throua:h common law. By 1908, mott
atatee bad udoptod it by ca"e law. Id . There ia an exten1ive body oflite:ratute rogardina
th~ origin.a or employment at will and r~a$0nlf for tho propagat.ion and perpctuo&ion or
the doctrine. St~ 1e'1eroUy Summers, 1upra noto 24. uL 66-68: Parker, •upro not.a 23. at
349-52.
"' Stt Payne v. Western & Alt R.R., 8 1 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884) ("All may
diami.aa t.heir 1mployefe)1 at will, be they many or few, for good caUJe, for no cauee or
even for cauae moralt,y wrong, without being thereby ru.Hty or Jegal wrong."), owrrul«I
on othu '""'"""· Hutton v. Watters, 179 S. W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
m Stt Cynthia I... &tlund, Wrongfil/ Di«horge l'rot«t:iC#IS in on Al·Will
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The United States, the largest economy in the world, is
a maverick among industrialized nations in clinging to
employment at will.'" The member nations of the European
Union, for example, have substantially more employment
protection law than the United States."' Other nations with
more protective labor Jaws look wistfully at the productive
economy and low unemployment of the United States, but they
disparage our limited legal regulation of the workplace and
comparatively slight protection of employee rights ...
Employment at will is often credited with creating the
IVorld, 74 TEX. L. Rl1V. 1655, 1657 (1996) t"Tbe 1urroundinc •t·wlll repme afTetll not
only Ille a~rmath or an n.rauably wrongl'ul dl1chargo and the availability or a remody:
it allo aJl'ot11 employee condue\ and dynamit1 at tht wotkplaot."): Summers, 1upro
note 24, at 65 1•111 ttntadot retch Into IMminily remote are.u or labor law, ror at ill
f'Oolt la a rW>damtnUI loial &11umptioo rocanlins lite rtlatlont bttWMO an emplonr
and ill employoe9."). Cf. Mark A. Rothtttio, Wf'Oll6ftJ/ R1(1uol to Hire AJ1«1ti111 tloc
Other Halfo(tloc EmpJoyment·at-Wlll Rul<, 24 CoNN. L. RllV. 97, 98 (1991)
hu
become aaeoclated with the more senora! principle that, abtont a 1u1u11 to tbt

rm1

contrary. an employer h•• the riaht to hire or fire any perwon for any rea1on.i.
114
Summer1, 1uprn note 24, at 66 ("'nle law, by ,tvlnr total dominance to the
employer, endow• the employer wllh the divine right to rule the working 1ive1 or Ito
autUcct cmployeOI."). Cf, Au11in, 111pro note 200, at 8·12 (d~cu .. ing Lho wide latitude

court.a give employer• t.o u1e 1bu1lva authority lO direct 01nployce.' activities).
.. Su,,.,,, Summan, '"P'° note 24, ftt 65 ('The United St..t.ea, unlike elmoat
every othtr indu1trlall&Od oouniry and many developlns countriu, baa neither adopted

thro\llh the common law or by 1t.atuta • ,e.nera1 protectJon 1.pln1t unfair di1miu1I or

withoutjuat <&uae, nor evoo "DY period or notice."); Donald c. Dowllnc, Jr.,
Tiie Prodltt of l nt.,.natlanal Labor 4 EmpJoytrunt Law: El<Orf Your
Labor/ EmpJoyment Cli1nl4 into the Global Mill•nnlum, 17 LAL l..\W. 1, 13 (2001)
(•American bUJineuee &N at.Hped in their unique and P«Ul1ar employmeni..at--wUI
doctrine, which even other An1lo-1y•l<m countrleo like Ensland, Canada, and
Au1tralia rejected yearo •AO."~ Unaurprl•ingly, The Unit.id Stn1<1 hao not rotified tho
d~

convention of the lnt.ernatJonal Labour Orga.nlzatlon on Tenninallon or Employment,
which provides that "emp1oymonL of o worker aha.II not bo torniinated unless there ia a
valid reason ror such tcnninu.tion connected wlt.h tho capacity <Jr conduct. of the worker
or based on the operational requirements of t..he undertaking, e1-tablishment., or
service." lntemat.ional Labor 01"(anizat.ion, Termination or Employment Convention,
June 22, 1982, avoilabt. at http://www.ilo.org. The convention hu been "'tified by 82
countries.
,. Kohler, '""'° note 82, at 103-04 ("Aa ia gen•rally known, th<> Uniu.d Statft
hiltorically bu provided comparatively meager formal lecal prottctiool or lite
employment rel•tion.thip. Foreign obeerven typically characterize us u a 'hire and

fire' eociety . .. .").

"' s.. Rocer Blanpain, Employm<nt and Labour Law: The European Uniqn,
in CoMPARATIVE LABOUR AND IM>USTRIAL RELATIONS lN INOUSTRIAWEO !dARKET
EcONOMJES 129 (Roger Blanpain, et al. eds., e• ed. 1998). Prime Minister Tony Blair of

the United Kingdom ha11 championed the notion or a "'third we.y; between the
deregulation, low labor 1t.andard1, and low unemployment of the United States and the
United Kingdom on the one hand, and the heavy regulation, high labor standarda, and
high unemployme.nt of the European natio.ns. Stt. e.g., Roundlo.bl.e Di«ussion: What
th• &perWicu of IM Rcctnt Patt Tt.U U• About tlll Labor and Employmont Law of tM
Futwe. 76 L~'D. L. J . 177, 183 (200ll loommenta or Profouor Catherine Barnard of
Trinity College, Cuibridge Univenity~
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flexibility in the United States labor market, although that
proposition is dubious."'
B.

Emplc>yment Law Expansion by Legislation and
Common Law

Despite its notoriety, employment at will does not, of
course, reign unchecked in the United States. The current
landscape of labor and employment law in the United States is
a patchwork of federal legislation and related case law, as well
as state legislation and common law tort and contract theories.
At the federal level, the Wagner Act (NLRA) was enacted in
1935."' The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) followed in
1938.... The FLSA represented a different approach to legal
regulation of the workplace than that of the NLRA. The NLRA
sought to invest the weaker party, workers, with more power 80
that they could decide what they wanted from the employer,
make their demands known, and obtain whatever their
collective power enabled them to obtain. Section 7, the heart of
the Act, recognized the following general rights of employees:
self-organizing; forming, J01mng, or assisting labor
organizations; bargaining collectively through representatives
of their own choosing; engaging in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection; and the right to abstain from the foregoing
activities.•• Everything that was legal was on the table under
the NLRA - workers could try to obtain whatever they
wanted."' Other than the broad § 7 rights, the NLRA made
,. John T. AddiJJOn. The U.S. En1ployrn~111 Afirocle in Comparative
P1rsJJ«tivc, 19 CO•IP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 283, 291(1998); Kohler, 1upro nOC.O 32, 1t 106
(1tatinc t.hlJ commonly held belief, but quo1t.lonJnc iL).
• Pub. t. No. 74-198, 49 &al. 449 (mdllied ••amended at 29 U.S .C. ti 161·
58 ( 2000)).
- Pub. t. No. 75-718, 52 StaL 1060 (1938) (a>difled u emended ll 29 U.S.C.
H 201-219 (2000))•
... 29 u.s.c. f l 57 (2000).
w Set Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Antl·Unkm Federal Employment Policy, 24
HARV. J.L. & Pun. POLC'Y 489, 490 (2001) (dMCrlblng the NLRA •• •con•litutlve;

establishing a Cto1ncwork for employees to obtain ror them3elve• what the employment
laws provide by dlroct intervention). Senator \Vngner'• legislative ualst.anL a.nd the
principal draftomen of the statute, Leon Keyaorlinr, 10id, -1r1t was our view that the
greatest contributJon to greater equity a11d the dlttribution of the product between
wages end prolil would come, not through tbe definition of terms by government. but
by the proc81 of mll..,.ive ba.rgaininf with l1bor placed in • position nearer to
equality.• Kenneth M.. Casebeer, Holdu of IM Pwn: An lntuv~lD with 1AOn X,,,Ml'li"ll
on Dra/ling IM WQttur Act, 42 U. MLUIJ L. RJ!V. 286, 297 (1987).
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nothing an inalienable right of the workers. In contrast, the
FLSA declared a minimum wage, a maximum number of hours
before overtime was due, and minimum ages for engaging in
work and for certain types of work. Thus, unlike the NLRA, the
FLSA established minimum rights, mandated by Congress,
which cannot be altered through bargaining between employer
and employee.
In 1960 there were only two generally applicable federal
labor acts. Beginning in 1963, a plethora of federal employment
laws were enacted,"' from the Equal Pay Act in 1963 to the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993. Since then the
expansion bas stopped at tho federal level. There have been
numerous bills introduced in Congress, but none enacted. Still,
the period of 1963-1993 witnessed a proliferation of federal
employment legislation - at least compared with the history of
labor and employment law in this nation before the 1960s."'
States also have been very active in the last four
decades in creating employment law, both by legislation and
case law.• Some state statutes more or less track analogous
federal statutes, such as state employment discrimination
statutes,"' while others create rights not recognized by federal
law. Among the types of employment laws enacted by state
legislatures are workers' compensation acts, wage payment
acts, covenant-not-to-compete laws, employment reference
statutes, and a variety of other individual employment rights
statutes. State courts have also recognized numerous contract
and tort theories of recovery, including implied contracts,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
promissory estoppel, wrongful termination in violation of public
policy, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.'" Wrongful discharge in violation of public
m See 111pra notes l -lts 11nd accompnnying text.

* Sa. tt..g., George Nicolau, A Con1po.ri1on of Unlon and Non·Unio11 Empl.oyee
ProtoctiOM in r,..t;,nd and I~ Unit«l Stou1, 14 N.Y. LNT'L L. REV. 33, 34 (2001) ('There
bu been, in the United $'81.., over lh• last four dttad.., what I have called

elsewhere, the •Europeanization of the American workplace'-an overlay or protective
legialation that is relatively new and which introducce prot.ecUona that largely did not
mat before the 19601.").
- Rothstein, •upro note 223; Koh~. •upro note 32, at 106-07; Micluoel D.
Moberly &: Carolann E. Doran, TM NOH of IM Com<I: E:rtendi"I IM PublK: Policy

Exc•ption Beyond the Wro1111ful Dischar11e Co1ue:rt, 13 LAB. LAw. 371 (1997),
"' S.. Michael D. Moberly, Proc~dilllJ Oeometrioolly: &thinking Parallel
Stal• and FedmJl Emplaymtnl Diacrimlnation LiligaJion, IS WHJrnBR L. REv. 499
(1997).
DT

See. ~.g., Kohler, 1upra note 32, at 120-21.
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policy is a tort created specifically for the employment setting,..
and it is the most recent tort to gain general acceptance
throughout the nation.•
It is fair to say that the hire-and-tire employment law
regime of the United States has developed a considerable body
of employment regulation since 1960."' Reasons commonly
assigned for the high level of activity at both the state and
federal level, through both legislation and case law
development, are the concurrent precipitous decline in union
representation in the 1960s through the 1990s'" and the
emergence of an individual employee rights approach to
regulating employment. Indeed, Congress has abandoned the
collective rights regime of collective bargaining and
wholeheartedly embraced the individual rights approach to
regulating employmeot.w• Yet the law would not leave
., ProfeHor M•.rk Oorgun dlslinlJUl•heo between wrongful dlochariC In

vlolatlon of public policy on lhc one h"nd, and collateral tort&, such "'" defamation,
lnvaaion of privacy, ond intantlonnl lnnlctlon or emotional dittreu on tho othtlr.
Gergen, 1upro nole 28, •t 1693. The I.Ort of wrongful discharge in viololion of public
policy acluolly con be trnc:cd to •• enrly •• 1959.
Kenneth A. Sprang, B1wort th1
TOOlll/111 T;.,ir: A Critique of ll1r Afodtl Rruploy1nenr Tern1i11alion Act, 43 AM. U. I...
Rav. 849, 866 (1994) (cilln11 Collfornlo CHO). h did not take hold, however, unlll tho
publication of Profeuor Lawrence Bl•dt 't pothbreakin& article, EmplOJ1mrnt at Wtll "'·
Individual Frttdom: On Llmlti1111 thr J\bu1iw EJ<erc/M of Emplo;ycr Powor, 67 COWM.
L. Rav. 1404 11967). Profe11Mlt BladN actually arsued for a broader abuoive d'-charse
tort than the current veniona ofwronsf\11 dlacharp in violation of public policy, but hJo
article fueled the debata over tort law'• role In llmitlns tmployment at will. Id.
• Sa, •-1.. Bttiuiein, 1upro nOIAI 39, at 1647 lcallin1 W1'0t\Cful diadwp the
""'"t p.._,joua of the four new 1u.-.llal ioru-the other three bein& IIED, invuloe of
privacy, and product. liability). n,. Only (our Ital.el that do not recosnize tome version
of wnmcful dioc.harge in violation of publlc policy are Alabama, Louisiana, New York,

s..

and GeoJ11ia. Even lhll l11tln1 It quNtlonoble becau1e Louiaiana has a otatut.e that
ccdifiea &ome branche1 of the tort. LA. Rav. STAT. N<N. I 967 (2003). Montana doee not
really reeog:rilie tho tor1, bul IL bu a aonor•I wronaful discharge 1tatut.e. MONT. 0001
ANN. ff 39-2-901 lo 915 (2002).
,.,. S«, e..g,. Kohler, eupra note 82, at. 104 ("'De1pite our renown for relatively

abatC!mioua public intervention In workplnce reJaUonahlps and our gener'l preference
(or private ordering, the previous tAln to flf\ccn years has been a period of unu1u1l
legialatlvo and judicial aotlvlty."); Duffy, 111pro nooo 201, at 387-88 (discueeing the

•rapid change'" in U.S. employment low),
141
Union density in private 1ector employment. decrerased from about a t.b1rd
of th& workforce at ite height in the mid to late 1950s to less than ten pen:ent by \he
end of the century. UniM Mtmbtnt 0..:line to 16.3 Million a.t S"4tt of Employtd SllPI
to IS.5 Parent, DAILY LAB. RllP. (BNA), Jon. 19, 2001 (No. 13), at 016. Kohler, 1upro

note 32, at 104 (discussing docHnin1 union denaity u a reason for upe.n1.ioa or
employment law); Paul-· Socio/ Chon111 and Judicial Rnpona: TM Hondboolr
Es#pticn to Emp/oym«nt·M ·Will, 4 EMPLOYU RIGHTS & EMP. PoL'V J . 231, 234-35
(2000) ("(UJnprecedented decline in \11\ion deoaity and influence at the end of the 1970.
and beginning of the 19808 elfoctlvoly olimiuled collective barp.ining u a senuine
ahemative to the at-will regime.->.
"' James J . Brudney. &(llCtionl on Group Action and th< Low of the
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employees unprotected; individual rights lawa began filling
gaps when union representation and collective bargaining were
not viable options, as was the case for most employees."'
Historically, then, the American workplace has been
regulated in several different ways,"' resulting in aome
discernable divisions. Firlit, employment law can be
implemented at either the federal or state love!. Second, it can
be either statutory or common law. A third classification
divides employment law into the c:ollectivo right.slbargaining
approach of the NLRA, and the individual rights approach that
has beon the regulation of choice during tho lost fifty years.'"
The individual righta approach includes federal and state
statutes, as well as at.ate contract and tort theories of recovery.
Within the individual right.a statutes, a further division
exists. There are minimum rights statue.es that prohibit or
mandate specific acliona by employers, and those that do not.
For example, tho FLSA requires employers to pay a minimum
wage and overtime pay, and it restricts child labor. Likewise,
the FMLA mandac.es that employers grant employees up to
twelve weeks of leave for certain family and medical purposes.
Other examples include tho WARN Act, which requires
employers to give sixty days notice of a plant closing or mass
layoff, and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA),
which prohibits employers from requiring employees to take
polygraph examinations, or from taking adverse employment
actions based on the results, except under certain
circumstances.
Wor4p/act, 74 TllX. I.. Rt.V. 11183, 1671 (1996) ("At oomt point during thla l•sl•lative
b•rrs.1e. lt l>Kama clenr thRt Oor1grel!1 vlawftd governmt'lnt l'CJfJ\llAtioo founded 01\
lndividual employment richt., nlher than collective ~rt1inlnc betw...n priv1t1
lhe prinwuy m«lwlism (Or onlmnr emplo)'IMnl nlelble and
rtdieuibutinr 1c "); Re\>el B. Sdlilw, ,.,_ Group R<ihu 1o
I~ ubtnift: l'oot·WGT Labor z...,, Ldvo/U..., and IM W<IJl"'I of Un~A. 20 Bnx:zuv J !:MP. • LAL L. 1, 73 (1999) C"S1- lhe t960o, lhe labor
mov•IMllt bu 1ull'ered l'rom American Ubenlitm'1 ~Ion or the croup bull ol' ito
own put and le. inebility to ftnd a p!Aee r... croup ri&:ht1 wlthln lht .-let ol'lndlvldual
ri&:hto It dlnp to oo dMrly ").
"' s..m.-n, •UJKO note 35, It 10 (-n,,, OOOMqllO- ii "'-eble, I( lnevitlblr. ii' coll•••i.., ~raalnln1 cloM not pl'Ol«l the Individual omplO)'t!e, the l1w
will find 1nothor way to prol«t the w•altu petty.").
.... Pro(e111or Kenneth Dau&hmldt. dit1cueae1 the 1\r.nath• and WflAknMl8 or

eatili<ll. u

(our different methode u1td to 1ddre11 the l•&•l prote<:tlon or workero: lndivlduol
baipinlng. col!K<iva ~rplnlll(, lesielative ....,J1tiOC1, and developmo11t or the
_,_law. Oau..$clunkh.
DOit 23, 1t 686•
.. $«, q ., Kalhorine Van Woul SLOM, 7"' Lqoq of lnd..uia/ Plurolum:
n.. T r - &tuwn lndw rdWJ/ Bmp/,opMnt Ri6AU Giid tlw N<VJ lJwJJ Cdl«livr
&rrainu11Syot.,,., 59 U. Clil. L. RIN. 675 (1992~
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Those minimum rights statutes stand in contrast to the
anti-discrimination statutes. Although anti-discrimination laws
are a type of individual rights law and are usually classified as
minimum rights statutes, they differ from the foregoing
minimum rights laws in an important way. The FL.SA, FMLA,
and other laws of that minimum-rights ilk require or prohibit
employer action, without addressing employers' motivation
(with the exception of the anti-retaliation provisions). In other
words, an employer paying below minimum wage or denying
the FMLA leave provisions violates the statute regardless of
the reason for the action. In contrast, the anti-discrimination
statutes do not prohibit employment actions unless they are
taken because of the employee's race, sex, disability, etc.'" They
prohibit employment actions motivated by bad reasons.
The history of employment law in the United States
reveals different regulatory approaches to various issues at
various times. In the early part of the twentieth century, the
collective rights model prevailed th rough federal legislation.
The 1960s witnessed the beginning of the individual rights
regime, again through federal legislation. In turn, from the
1970s through the end of the century, the states created
individual employment rights through statutes and case Jaw.
This evolution stemmed from the recognition that the one-sizefits-all approach of the NLRA did not work. The changing
landscape of employment in the United States required new
and different law at different times. In light of this diverse
history, one should not expect a single approach to work in the
next century.'"
C.

Regulating Firing and Other Terms and Conditions of
Employment

Much of the reform and debate in employment law
during the latter part of the twentieth century was about
limiting employment at will by recognizing different types of
wrongful discharge law, including the employment
discrimination statutes."' Although Title VII covers all types of
See, e.g.• Kim, 3upro note 20, at 1517.
Cf. Summers, supra note 35, at 24 {f'I fear that becaus& of the wide variety
of right.a to be protected and our hesitant legal recognition of them, the solution must
be piecemcaJ and will inevitably be incomplete.").
1411
See EstJund, supra note 223 (discussing the evolution and state of wrongful
discharge law); Parker, supra note 23 (discussing common law and legislative
Ull
t.d
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adverse employment actions, and at its inception was viewed
more as a means of addressing discriminatory refusals to hire,
most Title VII cases in the last twenty years or so have been
termination cases.'" Harassment law under Title VII is the
most significant departure from a focus on wrongful discharge
under the employment discrimination statutes. Of course,
there have been laws that regulate terms and conditions of
employment other than discharge, such as the FLSA , the
FMLA, the Equal Pay Act (EPA), and tl1e WARN Act at the
federal level, and workers' compensation and wage payment
statutes at the state level. Still, it is fair to say that the major
battle of the latter half of the twentieth century was largely
about employment at will and wrongful discharge.
Only one state in the nation bas legislatively abrogated
employment at will, and no other state is poised to do so.
Moreover, statutory modifications of the at-will doctrine have
not so clearly favored employees claiming wrongful discharge.""
ln 1996, Arizona enacted the euphemistically named Arizona
Employment Protection Act, which consolidated the legal
tlleories that could be pursued in termination cases.'" The
Arizona Act was passed in reaction to a pro-employee decision
of the state supreme court, and most have understood it to be a
pro-employer effort to curtail tort and contract theories of
recovery."' Under the Arizona Act, employees can sue under
only the tlleories delineated therein, and tile courts do not have
discretion to recognize other claims. Specifically, the Act
restricts courts from expanding the tort of wrongful discllarge

approach•• to employment at will).
"' John J. Donohue Ill & Peter Seligmann, 7'he Changing Nature of
Eniplqymcnl Discriminotion Liti1Jalion, 48 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015·16 (1991).
2
'° Psrker, supra note 23, at 373 (.iworkers i.n other jurisdictions could
probably expect the same pro-employer ca.at existing in the ~fontana legislation.•).
'" ARIZ. REV. STAT. §41:1461 (1996).
'lt.:I The act was intendOO. to stem the expansion of wrongful diacha_
rge in
violation of public policy tho Arizona legislature discerned in the Arizona Supreme
Court's decision in Wagenseller v. Seottodale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)
(en bane) (the famouA "lwloon Rivet' case). See Marzetta Jones, Note, The 1996 Arizona.
Employment Protection Act: A Return to the Employrnenl-· At· Will Doctrine, 39 ARIZ. L.
Rev. 1139 (1997) (dMC:ribing the act as the "Legislature's response to the trend away
from empJoyment·at.-wiU thot began in the mid·l.980s"); Jenny Clevenger, Comment
and Legislative Review, Arizona*• Emptoy"1ent Protection Act: Drawing a Line in the
Sand Betwttn tht! Court and the LegU!/aJure, 29 ARJZ. ST. L.J. 805 (1997) (•tating that
the set '"effected dramatic changes ... halting, and, in some instances, reversing the
expansion of employee rights in Arizona and severely limiting rooovcry in tort where
those rights ar-e violated'").
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in violation of public policy beyond legislatively recognized
policies.
Even the heralded Montana Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act of 1987,"" which made Montana the only state
in the nation to generally abrogate employment at will by
prohibiting terminations without good cause, may not have
been such a good result for employee plaintiffs. It, too, was a
reaction by employers and insurers to the expansion of the
common law theory of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which had resulted in some large recoveries by
plaintiffs.• • Because of limitations on remedies, the average
size of jury awards has been substantially reduced, with the
median award in one survey being zero."' The Model
Employment Termination Act (META), promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1991, has not been adopted, or even seriously considered, by
any state to date. Further, employee rights advocates have not
uniformly applauded it...
Employment at will has withstood the efforts by
employment law reformers. While many contract and tort
theories have been recognized since the 1970s, there has been
retrenchment in the last decade or so, and employment at will
is perhaps stronger now than it was twenty years ago."'
Although one could predict in the 1980s and early 1990s that
more states would follow Montana's lead in enacting wrongful
discharge law,.. the resurgence of employment at will and the
ebbing of contract and tort theories limiting the doctrine
indicates that there will be no more state legislation enacted in
the foreseeable future.... It cannot be surprising that
... M ONT. CODE ANN.

H 39-2-9011.0 914 (2002).

.. 1-~arc Jartuli~. Proi«tins Work•r• From Wrongful Diacltarp: •tonio.110~1
Expui<nce With Ton ond SJotuJory Rrgim••. 3 EMPLOYEE R'l's. & EMP. POL'Y J . 106.
107 (1999~ Parker, •upro note 23. at 371·73.

- Jar1u1ic. 1upro note 254, et 122.
"' SN Sprang. 1upro note 238. ot 86~; Parker. 1upra note 23. at 376·79.
•t Sun1mcr1, •upra note 24, at 85 (•ITJhe trend in the last ten years hu been

toward moro employer dominance."); Parker, M1Jpro note 23, at 350·51 (di1cu1sln1 the
scrutiny of c1nploymont al will during thu l070t nnd '80t:, but concJuding that courts
have not dove.loped coherent tort and contract low rcrttrding the doctrine); Kim, 1upra
note 17, ut 680 (11 Dospite the many calls for reform, the at-will rule ha1J retained ita
vitality and, i( •nything. has been regaining strength in recent years."),
"' Alan 8. Krueger. TM Euolution of U1vu1J-Di1miasol Lqi1lo1ion in tM
Unired 5101... « lNDUS. & LAB. Ru. Rsv. 644, 658 (1991).
"' Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, EmplOJ'm•nt in tit• N•w ~ of Trude ond
TeclurcUJc: Implication• for Labor and Emplqym<nt Low, 76 IND. W. 1, 36 (2001~
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employment at will has proven so resilient. For employers,
there is no more sacrosanct principle of law. Employers wish to
oper ate their businesses as they choose with no regulation by
federal or state government. Employment at will is the
embodiment of no regulation; legislatures do not pass laws to
regulate and court.a do not second-guess employers' termination
decisions.•
The tempest over wrongful discharge is not likely to
abate completely in this century, but there is a noticeable shlft
toward debate about reforming the law and increasing the
protections regarding other terms and conditions of
employment. One reason for this shift is the intransigence of
the at-will doctrine. Another reason is that workers are less
conce.rned with termination because job tenure is short,
currently three and a half years on average.•• If employees do
not stay in jobs long, job security and employment at will may
be of less concern than making the workplace a pleasant, or at
least tolerable, environment while they are there."'
Ultimately, the failed efforts to statutorily abrogate
employment at will hold three broad lessons for those who seek
to reform the law regarding electronic and genetic privacy
invasions, bullying, and other existing and future workplace
problems. First, employers do not li.k e to be regulated, and they
will oppose employment law, particularly legislation, which
provides a concrete target when it is introduced in a

or

Parker, 1upro note 23, at 40<I C"[Llea11lotive remedieo offer little real hope 1uca11.").
"" Ono judge •n•logi•cd tho hand1-ofl' opproach
courts lo at.will
te.nnination1 to the court.a' no.-faolt "l>proacb to divorce.a: "Our law chooaea not to
involve ii.elf with the unfair ..id 1ubjective treatmtnl leading lo tl>Me broken at-will
ttlationah.ia» in a manner which ii 10mt1what analopua to no-fault divortt.• NieholN
v , Allstate ln1. Co., 799 So. 2d 830, 860 (La. Ct. App. 1999) CC....away, J ., di1M!nlln1J,
rru'd, 765 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000).
'" BLS Report.1 Lil/It Change /11 Job Ten11ro Sintt 1983; Oop &tween So:e1
Narrow/111, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNAl, Aus. 30, 2000 (No. 169), at DI (ttportinr Bureau
of Labor &andanls aurvty lhat found median Unure of workera with their current
employer i• 3 \i yeart~ Henry S. Farber, TreN:/1 ;. Long Term Bmp/oyment "' t~
Uniled Sto~1 1976·96, In GLOBAL COMPl:l'ITION Al'IO THE A>ll!RICAN El!Pi.OYMEN'l'
l.ANDSCA.PE: AS WE ENTER '!'HE 21" CENTURY, Pl!OCEEDINOS Ot' NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
620 ANNUAL CoNFERENCI ON LABOR 63, 89 (Samuel E1treicher ed., 2000) (lhe "fraction
of worl<or1 who were in long-term employment relationahipa doclincd aignifieanlly
between 1979 and 1996, with a di1proportionate 1hatt or the d<lc:line - · ·
1993") ()lerelnafter GLOBAL COMPE'!TMON).
'.ltn Prores15or Dau-Schmidt explains: "Juat-a.uae protection ia critica_
1 only
when the incumbent. job 11 clearly better for the worker than otbar jobs. A worker
aulTen 1... damage from being terminated from a particular job that., with hlirh
turnover, he probably would have left In a few yean anyway.• Dau-Schmidt., 1upro note

or

.mce
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legislature. Second, employers will ferociously oppose any law
that appears to weaken employment at will."' Third, the
Montana experience demonstrates an exception to the
foregoing principles. If the common law has moved in a
direction unfavorable to employers so that employment at will
no longer provides reliable immunity in the courts, then
employers may support legislation if they can fashion laws that
restore them to a more favorable situation."'
IV. RESERVATIONS A.BOUT LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
EMERGING WORKPLACE PROBLEMS
As the noted scholar Clyde Summers once remarked, Congress, in
enacting legislation, does "not move by s mall s teps but rather by
sporadic leaps.• Those leaps, some might be tempted to add, have not
always been preceded by n careful look. Assuming we have reached
one of thoee notable legislative momenta in employment ordering,
how far and in which direction Congress might be inclined to vault is

unclear.•

As discussed above, a legislative approach is only one of
the methods used to regulate employment in the United
States,"" and only one of the approaches to guaranteeing
individual employment rights. Many employee rights advocates
have become perhaps too enamored of federal or state
legislation as the best means of regulating employers' conduct
and protecting employees' rights.•• As the analysis in this
1
''ll

I am not revealing a great Jnyst.ery here. Employee rights advocates who
are proposing reforms that can be mode without gut.ting employment at will, and who
can restrain themselves from railing sgoinst it, know that. the. beftt. chance for their
proposed law is to walk gingerly around employment. at. will. See, e.g., Yamada, supra
note 16, at 531 (arguing that. the proposed status-blind haraumant. law does not
aubst.antially impinge upon employment at will - certainly not as much as Title V11
does).

* Profeuor Alan Krueger ha$ examined the 1-fontana experience and nine
other states in which just caus.o legislation was introduced in the legislature, only to
fail. Krueger, supra note 258. Profeasor Krueger concludes that. leghilat.ion to abrogate
empJoyment at will is more likely to be introduced when courts have aignificantly
eroded employment at will through common law theories. Id. at 658; Parker, aupra
note 23, at 373.
,. Kohler, •upra note 32, at 119 (quoting Clyde W. Summers, A Summary
Eualuation ofthe Ta/1-Harlky Act, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 405, 405 (1958)).
2
• See supra notes 244-4 7 and accompanying text.
w Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, al 698 (noting the current preference for
legislative regulation); Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at 32 n.128 ("'In part. the preference
for Title VII (rather than torts to addre$.9 harassment claims) may reflect a scholarly
bias in favor of federal law.-); Kim, supra. note 20, at 1500-01 (discussing the desire of
advocates of genetic discrimination lagi.slation to claim the moral authorily of th" civil
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section shows, legislation is not the best approach to regulating
electronic privacy invaders, genetic discriminators, and bullies.
A

Politicai Limitations of a Legislative Approach

Employers claim t.hey are besieged by legal regulations
and potential liability.• From their perspective, the vaunted
employment-at-will doctrine is a mere shadow of its former
self, so riddled with exceptions that it cannot be relied upon
any longer.• Although this may sound laughable to students of
the law who recognize that the common law incursions of the
1970s and 1980s have receded, employers in their operations
may take note of tho potontial for liability ond act as though
the legal realm outside employment at will is larger than il
actually is .... Moreover, the changing character of the economy
exacerbates this view. If U.S. businesses are to remain
competitive in a market of global competition,'" they cannot be
shackled with more and more employment regulatory laws that
impose inc.reasing costs."' Thus, legislation may become even
more difficult to enact in the era of globalization."'
risl•U mov•menl): .,_ Parkor, 1upro nol4 23, at 370 O•bellna wronaful diecharg•
loeialotioo "'!he cleul . . .,..china of employment law").
- Set. ~-4 , 01.80.-.i, •.upro note 33.
,. S.., q., Doborah A. B..Uam, Bmplopn<nl·Al·W11/ 1li« lmP<ndi"' 0.0111 of
0 DoctriM, 37 Alf. Bus. L.J. 663, 118? (2000) <"mhe ........ lht cwnnt tttDda in tho
wtMafUI dilCha,.. .,.. .•. tuuett that employen ooon wlll no longer be ablo to

or

terminate emplo,Yff9 for no c1uae or bftd cause. The future or employmenl·•t·will, lhfin,
ii Lhnt iL ha1 no future."). Bllt •ee Dowllnf, 1upru note 22~. aL l3-l4 (-U.S. employment

lawyers say thttt AmeriCR'• c 111ploymont at will hat erodod Away, but Lheir1 i1 a
bl1t.orical, not on lnternationRI panpoc;t.ive. By compftrl101\ to ot.bcr count..ria1,
employment at will 11 alive and well In the U.S.•.. ."I: E•tiond, 1upro now 223, at
1669 (a~ thot the employment·at..will doctrine •undennlneo and distorU the
operation of lwroncful dilc:hargo) law..%id. et 1688 ("Tho •l'l\lmeol that wn>ngf'ul
di.ocWuge law hu ovitoenlled employment at will is 1imply onntai.d.").
"' Cynthia L s.tlund, How
Are Empl-• Aboul Tlwir fU8hl• ond
Why Dea It MotMrl, 77 N.V.U. L. REY. 6, 16-17 (2002) (d-nbin1 viow of employment
law in which tho "thadow ol'the law" b larger than the law~
"' S.. 0.u-&!imldt. 1upro note 23, at 697·98, 702 (ditcu.,ing this iNue at
one or the limilatlon1 or the lofi1lative-regulation approach lo lepl\y protec:tlnc

w,..,,,

workert).

'°'""""'

m S.. Surt19 of Monufactu,..,...
Co.11 of Complylfll With IVOl'*p/°"
Rrzuln1ion1, DAILY LAB. REP. CBNAl, Jan. 24, 2002 (No. 16), It Al (detailing survey by
George &iaaon Univaraity'1 MottatUI Center reprding COit.a or compliance with
workplace lawt).
m Stt Stewart J . Schwab, PredU:ling lh• Fulurw of EimpWy11Ulnl Law:
R t/ltclifll or ~{roding MarAd FOl'ttsl, 76 IND. L. J. 29, 3-4 (2001) ("More frequently
will tho argumont be hoard ond accepted that a country unnot afford extravagant
omploymeni..law ~ono whoo other countri.. are only providing el!'tclent
~..,.."); O.u&bmX!t, wpro nol4 23. at 697.
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From federal and state legislators' perspective,
employment legislation is a political lightning rod.'" Although a
considerable number of federal employment statutes were
passed from 1963 to 1993,"' major federal legislation has not
been passed in the decade since. Of the proposed statutes on
electronic monitoring and genetic discrimination, the only ones
that have been enacted are genetic discrimination statutes at
the state level. The electronic monitoring bills are the most
revealing example of how hard it is to enact employment law.
The PCWA and NEMA would have imposed modest regulations
on electronic monitoring of employees,'" but they were bottled
up in congressional committees by business groups. The
California electronic monitoring notice bill was passed three
consecutive years by the legislature and vetoed by the
Democratic governor each time."' If such a meager limitation
on monitoring cannot become law in California with a
Democratic governor, it is hard to imagine where such a law
could be enacted. In sum, taken together, the dearth of federal
legislation in the past decade, the aggressiveness of the
employer's lobby, and the California experience with electronic
monitoring, illustrate that legislative responses to new
workplace issues face substantial political hurdles.
B.

Limitations of Minimum Rights Legislation

The proposed statutes also demonstrate the difficulty of
addressing general status-blind harassment and invasions of
privacy through legislation. The method does not fit well with
the protections that employees need. The general harassment
law is a minimum rights law that prohibits a type of
employment action, as do the FLSA, the FMLA, the EPPA, and
the WARN Act. The problem is that the law does not prohibit
something with sufficient specificity to be effective.
Harassment or bullying describes many acts and many
degrees of abuse. The anti-bullying law proposed by Professor
1"1~ &e Hill Watcher$ Fortstt Liule Acliuity on lhe Lo.bor and Employnient
Law Front, DAILY LAB. REP. <BNA), Aug. 9, 2001 (No. 163l (quoting Deron Zeppelin,

director of government affairs for the Society for Human Resourc& Management, a.a
saying, ..A.fost members of Congress, believe it or not, do not like to vote on

[employment[ issue&, period.").
m See supra notes 1.15 and aeco01panying text.
r.. See supro. notes 150·58 and accompanying tex:L
Yn

See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying texL
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Yamada and The Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute is
too vague to be useful - either in giving notice of prohibited
conduct and deterring it, or in giving courts a standard for
imposing liability."' To take sexual (and other Title VII)
harassment theory and sever the "because of ... "element is to
create a minimum terms statute with a vague standard: Do not
be abusive or mea.n to employees. Minimum terms statutes,
other than anti-discrimination statutes, work well when they
state specific actions that employers are required to take (pay a
minimum wage and overtime) or are prohjbited from taking
(requesting or requiring a polygraph examination, except under
certain circumstances). However, when the laws concern a
general type of conduct, they work poorly.
The electronic monitoring bills also are minimum rights
laws, but they suffer from just the opposite problem of the antibullying law. They are specific enough to be implemented but
provide little protection for expectations of privacy. If Congress
enacted a law that prohibited electronic monitoring, that would
be a substantial privacy protection law. Congress did pass a
similar law in another context in1988 - the EPPA, which
essentially prohibited employers from using polygraph
examinations."' However, because of the well-accepted
interests of employers, neither Congress nor any state
legislature will seriously consider a bill that prohibits
electronic monitoring; indeed, there is no need to waste time
considering such a law when even notice laws cannot be
enacted.• Consequently, the bills are restricted to requiring
notice, and they provide little protection of reasonable privacy
interests of employees.'" In this respect, the PCWA and NEMA

"' See Katherine V.W. St.on•, Tile New P1yehol1J11iooJ Contro<:t: Implkationo of
w.,.•place l'or Labor ond Emp/a;yment Law, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 519, 611
(2.001) (deocribinc Yamada'• pro.-.J u having• atandard thaL ii t.oo vague to apply,
and charademing iL u "providing broad new cooaptiono or workplace justice rather
than detailed bl\leprinlt ror lesal rd>nn"l. It is no answer thal IL prohibits harassment
m11<h u TiUe VD prohibits IOI end otheT tltt..._buod ti......menL Anti·

tM

C~

dilCrimination 11tw fOCUlff on the motivation or cause or the ad.vene employment
ection. Title Vfl doel not prohibit firing, hi.ring, OT hel'INiDJ unJetl it ii because O( a
protected characteriatic. In the atetus-bHnd harassment propo1a.l, tM.re is no becauaeof requirement. The difference renders the standsrd in the anti-bullying law too vague
to be used.
"' 29 u.s.c. H 2001-09 (2000>.
"" Frayer, tupro note 19, ot 873-74 (argillng that a bill lhat protecta privacy
interests sbou_
ld not be considered now in view of failure of notice bill.a).
2'l1 Stt. e.g., Kee.an, 1upra noi.e 19, at 300;. Wilborn~ 1upro note 19. at 851-62;
Frayer, tupru note 19, at 869.
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resemble other minimum rights laws that give employees
little."'
There is no quick fix for this flaw, making it all the
more fatal. lt would be difficult to draft a statute that falls
substantively between the notice laws and a prohibition on
monitoring-one that balances the interests of employers in
monitoring and the privacy interests of employees.• Balancing
tests are performed in specific factual contexts, and a statute
stating that specified interests must be balanced would not
provide the certainty or predictability that are the principal
objectives of legislation. In short, cose low still would develop
the practically useful principles.
Tho genetic discrimination statutes enacted by states
and introduced as bills in Congress fit more neatly within the
types of legislation that have been enacted in the past. Most
take the form of anti-discrimination laws by prohibiting
adverse actions because of a protected charact.eristic... The
laws also resemble minimum rights laws in that they impose
limitations on employers' requiring or requesting that
employees submit to genetic testing."' To the extent that the
genetic discrimination laws are minimum rights laws, most
legislatures are not willing to prohibit the testing altogether
because there are some good reasons why some employers for
some jobs under some conditions might need to require genetic
testing.• By mixing a minimum rights approach with an antidiscrimination approach, the laws manage to provide more
protection than most minimum rights statutes. The resort to
the anti-discrimination paradigm ls troubling, however, for
other reasons.

C.

Concerns About Anti-discrimination Law

The concerns in th.is section have little if any
implication for electronic monitoring laws, but they are
relevant to status-neutral harassment laws and genetic

"' Summe.-., • upra note 24., at 84-86 (1tatlng that "Olabor legialatlon In the
Unit@d States ls of\en half·hcarted.'' end aiving aa e:itamp1e!J several minimum ri(hte
laws): St.one, oupra note 245, at 686·38 (dl•cuHing problems with "individual

rights/minimum term& model of labor relation•").
"" Wilborn, •upra note 19, at 852·63, 876.
.. Feldman & Kati. •upm note 20, at 410·16 (surveying state lawo).
-

Id.
Td. at397.
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discrimination laws. The proposed statue-blind harassment law
is modeled on the harassment law that developed under the
federal employment anti-discrimination laws."' Despite the
success of past anti-discrimination laws, and probably because
of that success, they are the subject of frequent criticisms.
Because of the importance of these laws to our society, we
should be very cautious about using the anti-discrimination
model for addressing emerging workplace problems. Deploying
tho method too often dilutes its potency. Instead, the method
should be reserved for select instances of compelling public
policy to protect discrete groups that historically have been
discriminated against... By indiscriminately employing the
model, the proposed status-blind harassment law and the
proposed and enacted genetic discrimination laws could
weaken the employment anti-discrimination laws, although
that is by no means the intent of their proponents.•
The employment anti-<iiecrimination statutes have been
the most significant and most effective statutory labor Jaws
since the NLRA. Title VII, in particular, has generated a
monumental shift in employment law and society.'"' Anti·
discrimination law significantly impinges upon employment at
will, carving out a number of bad reasons, or "cause[s) morally
wrong,"'" for which employers cannot take adverse employment

• Stt 1upro notes 209-IS ond oooompanyini 1..t.
• Stt,
Kim. ••pro now 20, 11 1622-24 (- l d n s that a "history of

•-1.

oywum1tic ditcrUninatlon," one of the moot 1onorally occepted ruaona Cor exiatin1
ancl-di.criminotlon law, dOH not apply lo pnedc di.crimin1tion).
The importAnce of the low1 ind the publlc polley on whleh they are
founded haa not been more eloquently artlcu11ted thin lhla:
The antl..emp)oyme.nt. di1crimintttion l•w1 ue 1uil\atod wi.t.h a pubHc •ure for
n!A10n1 that are weU known ... Confl"C"ll ba1 re11pondftd to ... pernicious
mJto0neept.ion1 and ignoble h•tred1 with humanlt.luian lawt fon:nulated to
wipe out the iniquity of discrimination In 01nployment, not merely to
roco1npense che individuals 80 harmed but principally to deter future
violat.ions.

Tho anti*employment discrimination lawa Congre111 enacted consequently
rNOnate with a forceful public policy viJifyinr diacrimination.
Mnrdell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), ttrl. granted
a11djudlm•nl uacated, 514 U.S. 1034 (1995).
• Proreuor Yamada apeclfitally ~ea. Pror.-r Hapr'a UJUmeni.
reprdinr ouual lwusment law. S.. infra note 303. Yamada UJU"" that "the
•nactmfllt or. 1totu.-bllnd hoetile work environment law could 1pec:ially benefit~
who are la.rcet& of 1tatu.s-bued b.a.raument et well.· Yamada. 1upro note 16, at 529.
• Cf. Kim,
note 20, at 1524-25 (dlacuaoinr early successes ofTiUe VD•tft'ec:tu1tod • ehange in norms"- but recogni&inr that it hao lea impact now).
•• S... e.g., P.,ne v. W. & All R.R., SI Tenn. 607, 520 (1884i

••pro
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actions. Indeed, today the federal and state anti-discrimination
statutes and the case law developed under them stand as the
only significant counterweight to employment at will.'" Overall,
employment anti-discrimination law has drastically changed
workplaces, employment law, and society in the United States.
Notwithstanding the change wrought by the antidiscrimination laws, it is a precarious success. The biggest
success story is also the biggest and most attractive target.""
There is significant debate, beginning in 1964 when Title VII
was enacted and continuing to this day, about the animating
theory of the employment anti-discrimination laws. One theory,
and the one most often articulated, is the formal equality or
status-neutral theory, which posits that the purpose of the laws
is to eliminate race, color, sex, etc., from employment
decisions.'" The other theory, the antisubordination or
"protected-class" theory, holds that in order to achieve equal
opportunity in employment, the anti-discrimination laws must
eliminate barriers erected to impede groups that historically
have been discriminated against."'
Under the protected-class theory, the heart of protection
encompasses groups of people who have historically been
denied employment opportunities and otherwise discriminated
against. Under the formal equality theory, no group, regardless
of historical discrimination, is accorded different treatment.
Courts have articulated both theories."" Although the rhetoric
1111

One court rOOOb"llized this when it atated that '"di.scriminotion is much
more than public policy in Ohio, it ia eloarly in and of itaelr D,n except.ion t.o any ot.-will
employment agreement."' \Voods v. Phoenix Society of Cuyahoga County, No. CV.
370763, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis 2100, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (quoting White v. Fed.
Ra•ervo Bank, 660 N.E.2d 493 (1995)).
'" See, e.g., EPSTf:ffN, supra not~ 33; OLSON, supra note 33.
"" Schwart._ s11pro note 196, a t 1775-76; David S. Schwartz, Tile Case of the
Vanishing Protected Cl.ass: Re/1ectie>ns on Reuene Discrimina.tion~ A{firnulliue Actiotr~
arid Rocio/ Balancing, 2000 WJS. L. REV. 657 [hereiJlat\er Sc:hwartz, The Case of the
Va.nit1hiJig Protected Class) . Thht theory ia c1ose1y aligned with, if not synonymous with,
the perpetrator perspectiv0 on discrimination. See Alan David Freeman, Legit.i1t1i~ing
Racial Disc,rimination Through Antidiscrirnination Latu: A CriJical RevielU of Supre-rne
Court Doctrine, 62 MlNN. L . REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
"' See, e.g., McDonnell Douglo• Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973);
Schwartz, supra note 100, at 1776 (discussing the antisubordination or protectedMclas.s
theory of the anti-discrimination laws); Schwartz., The Case of the Vanishing Prolected
Claaa, supra note 294. This theory is closely aligned with, if not synonymous with, the
victim perspective on discrimination. See Freeman, supra note 294, at 1052-S?.
:ne Case law recognizing the legality of affirmative action under Title VII is
the moat. dramatic example of the protectedMdass theory. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tran.sp.
Agency, Santa Cloro County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Steelworkers v, Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979). A reoent. case exemplifying the statt1sMneut.ral theory is an age disc.rimination
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of the formal equality theory predominates in the cases, the
protected-class theory lives on in both rhetoric and substantive
djscrimination law. The most prominent examples of anti·
discrimination case law supported by one theory but
antithetical to the other are the disparate impact theory of
discrimination and affirmative action, which both draw from
the protected-class theory."'
Other examples exist in distinctions courts make in
disparate treatment cases. For example, some courts have
stated that for whlte plruntiffs to establish a prima facie case
under the McDonru!ll Douglas proof structure, they must
produce more evidence of discriminatory motive than African·
American plaintiffs.• Courts in some cases have held that for
male plaintiffs to establish a disparate impact clrum, they must
produce evidence of djscrimjnation that female plaintiffs are
not requfred to produce.• Many proponents of the formal
equality theory are hostile to the protected-group theory,
arguing that it uses anti-discrimination law to discriminate...
There are two fundamental problems with the statusblind harassment law proposal: it has a dangerous theoretical
underpinrung, and it ventures into a most controversial subject
area. Aa to the first point, status-blind harassment law is
grounded on arguments made by proponents of the formal
equality theory of employment anti-discrimination law, or
perhaps more pointedly, opponents of the protected-class
theory These arguments all rest on the idea that workplace
abuse causes a digrutary harm for men as well as women, and
the law must protect both equally.* This idea poses a threat to
cue in which the court of appe:ala pcnnitted • .,

ace dilCr'imination claim by younger

plaintitra who claimed that the employer diecriminat.cd against them on the basis of
_,.In favor of older employeea. Clin• v. Gen. Oynamlce Land Sya., Inc., 296 F.3d 466
(6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. ci 1766 (2003).
1
•
Schwartz, The Caae of JM Vani1hinf Pl'Olecltd Clau, aupra note 294, at
662·63. 671-76.
"" &... e.g.• Jadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 1999).
1
• Stt, e.g., Livingaton v. Roadway Expreee, l nc., 802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir.
1986). SH geMrolly Donald T. Kramer, \VhaJ C0111litute1 Reuene or Majority Race or
Nalh>nal Origin Di1eriminatioti V'wl.atiw of Ftdcral Conatitution or Stalutu - Priuo.te
Emp/oym<nt Ca1t1, 150 A.L.R Fed. I, f2b (1998): - also Timothy K. Giordano,
Comment, Diff<,...nl T,...tm<nl for Non·Minority Plaintiff• U!Uhr Titk VII: A Call for
Modification of th• Badground Circumolancu THI to Eltuun That S.JKJrole la Equal,
49 EMORY L.J. 993 C2000l.
- S<hwaru, The C- of tho Vanuhi"lf Pro<t<t<d C/oa, •upro note 294, at
668-70
"' Marl< Mclaughlin Hager, H,,,,,_,., a. a Ton: Why Tith VII Homu
Enuiron.rMnJ Ual>il~ Should & CIUUJil<d, 30 CONN. L. Rav. 375, 383 (1998).
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the anti-discrimination laws because it labels all
discrimination based on a protected characteristic as wrongful
and seeks to equally apply the laws in the same way to all
races, sexes and religions, regardless of historical
discrimination. For example, no different principles of Title VII
anti-discrimination law can apply to whites than AfricanAmericans; plaintiff-friendly presumptions that make sense
when applied to African-Americans because of the history of
employment discrimination must be applied to whites as well."'
Professor Yamada is aware of this danger nested in his
proposal, but awareness is no cure.'"'
This danger is one of the reasons that Professor Rosa
Ehrenreich proposed keeping the focus of Title VII on the
discriminatory
nature
of sexual
harassment
and
supplementing it with a modified tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to address the dignitary harms."' I do not
suggest that opponents of the protected-class theory wou ld
support status-blind harassment law; instead, they would
argue that the only legitimate theory of discrimination, applied
to harassment law, should lead to the untenable and infeasible
result of law that prohibits employers from being mean or
tolerating meanness in the workplace - the general civility
code argument, already rejected.
A second danger embedded in the status-blind
harassment proposal is that it takes as its model the most
controversial theory of anti-discrimination law - harassment.'"'
The efforts of Professor Catherine McKinnon and others to
establish the theory of sexual harassment under Title VII have
been well documented.''" Not only could it be argued at the
founding of the theory that it should have been left to tort
law,'" but the argument has been made since the sexual
harassment theory received the imprimatur of the Supreme

.,, See, e.g., Ulrich v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 824 F. Supp. 677 {S.D. Tex. 1993); see
generally Kramer, supra note 299, §2b; Giordano, supro note 299.
• Yamada, sitpro note 16, at 531 ("To say that the distinction between
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory harassment is morally untenable is to take a fair
point- that haraurucot of nny kind is wrong- too far.").
.,. Ehrenreich, Sllpm note 23. at 63.
806
See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111
HARV. L. REV. 445, 450 (1997); Ebrenreich, aupro note 23, at 7-8; Kohler, supr<> note
32, at 116.
3CJll See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supm note 23, at 32·36.

"" Id.
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Court."" As difficult as it is to explain the theoretical
underpinnings of sexual harassment law,"" it does not help to
create a status-neutral version.
While adding status-neutral harassment law would not
result in the repeal of federal anti-discrimination laws, it
unwittingly narrows the theoretical basis of antidiscrimination law and extends one of tho most vulnerable
theories - harassment. Employment anti-discrimination law
can be weakened in many ways without the statutes actually
being repealed."' Status-neutral theory and prohibition of
ambiguous conduct would make the law seem overly intrusive
in the workplace and perhaps make it look frivolous or
ridiculous. Opponents would thus argue that the law imposed a
general civility code and sanitized tho workplace, not only
attacking the status-neutral law in particular, but also by
implication all anti -discrimination employment laws, thus
potentially weakening the entire field.
The genetic discrimination laws arc not pure anti·
discrimination laws. ln the division between minimum rights
statutes and anti-discrimination statutes discussed above, they
should be classified in part as minimum rights laws, like the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act."' For eXDmple, to the
extent that the laws prohibit employers from requiring or
requesting that employees submit to genetic test.ing, they are
like the EPPA, a minimum rights statute. Most, however, are
not just minimum rights laws because most of the statutes do
not simply prohibit genetic testing. To the extent that they
prohibit adverse employment actions based on information
about genetic conditions, they are more like anti-discrimination
laws."' There is nothing wrong with the laws being a cross
• Hager. •upra note 301; EUen Frankel Paul, Sexual Jlaro..nunl o.t ~:r
Oi«riminalion: A 0.-ft<Jtiue Poradilm, 8 YALE L. & PoL'v Rxv. 333 (1990).
• Stt. <.g•• Bomtteln.
note 305, at 446; Ehrcnniich, •upra note 23, at

••f"O

7-16.
3
• Consider. for e.1.a.mple, the progres.sive narrowins or thfi diepante impact
theory o( diKrimination under Title VIJ, culminating in \Varda Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). At least some or that narrowing 1ub1equontly wu
reversed with the pRaaago of the Civil Right. A<t of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102·166, 105

StaL 1071 (1991) (codified n• amended at 42 U.S.C. t 19810 (2000) and scattered
1Cction1 of2 U.S.C., 16 U.S .C., 29 U.S .C., and 42 U.S.C.).
111
See Kim, aupra note 20, pasaJ'nJ (arguing that pnclic discrim_ination doe11
not fit the anti-discrimination par&digm and is better addttt.aed through privacy law).
•lf At. first blu.ah, one could aay they are minimum right.a lav.•1 just like the
EPPA, which also prohibito advorso employment actiono on lho buia of information
obtained from pol.nniphs. Unlike lhe information obulned by polygraph testa,
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between minimum rights laws and anti-discrimination laws.
However, their anti-discrimination aspects are troublesome.
Particularly troubling are their departure from prior antidiscrimination law in protecting a discrete, historically
discriminated-against group; their kinship with the Americans
with Disabilities Act; and their potential redundancy."'
First, unlike other anti-discrimination laws, the genetic
discrimination laws do not grow from a history of
discrimination against a particular group.' " Instead, they are
more like tho proposed electronic monitoring laws- a reaction to
advances in science and technology. The "genetically
defective""' have now sped past other candidate groups, such as
homosexuals and parents, to be protected by state employment
anti-discrimination laws,"• and there is a chance that Congress
will pass a genetic discrimination law before it passes a sexual
orientation anti-discrimination law."' There is no requirement
that a group of people who face discrimination in employment
must line up and wait their turn for protective legislation,
never breaking in line. Still, tho history of employment anti discrimination law in this nation reveals long periods of
incubation for civil rights laws in which the record of historical
discrimination is publicized, political alliances are forged, and
howovv. the lnronnotlon obtained by genetic 1...11n1 11 lnronruotion •boul a ponon'a
inherent cliarad.eriatico.
tu Profouor Kim diacunell IOmct of thOH reuDM and otbtti for her rejection
or the anti4iKriminelion model for genetic dilCl'lmlnaUon. She aleo argum that. 10m1
of the pracUCJJI difficulties with anti-diacrimirtadon h1w, auch u the proof 1tNctura1

and doctrine. t.bot have made diBCriminotlon caac1 difficult to win and COJ1Uy to
litigate, would be incorporntcd into genetic dl,.criminl\tion IRw. See Kim, 1upro noLll 20,
at 1524-28.
"' Sec, e.11.. KJm, aupro note 20, at 1618·20; cf. Peggie R. Smith, Part11lal·
Statu1J Employ1~ru Dl1crin1ino.tion.: A Wrong In Nud of a Risht, 35 U. MICH. J.L
REFORM 669, 604-07 (20021.
1 15
"We're all mut.ant11 ... everybody i1 renedcally defective.• Brian l\,f. lrotL,,
Common!., <hnttkoll:t 0.f«tive: Th• Judi<iol lnlt'Pn!lotW. of the Am•ritoM with
Di.labilitin kt flail• 10 Proud Agoin•I <hnttlc Di«n"mi110tion in tltr Worllpl.oce, 35 J.
MAPSH'U. I.. REY. 467, 457 (2002) (quoting Dr. Michael Kaback); Kim. ••pro note 20,
al 1520 ("Even conceptualizing the relevant dil8dvantaged "group• raioet aome
difficulties, given that. e.aeh individual's genetic n11t..erial contains some anom1Jie1 that
0

predi•J)OOO lO dil6AIMl.

) .

11
•

There nre about 31 states that have paaed genetic di11criminalion Iowa.
See NHGRJ Wobli!Al, Nllpra note 145. Only 11 •tates have sexual oriont.otion
discrimination Iowa. A1Jchaol OeHkat., Dl#Crin1il1atlon Low Update, in LITIOATlNO
EMPLOYldENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 2002, al 134 (Practicing Law Institute Litlg. 8t
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series, No. HO-OOFC, 2002).
•n Rqarding attempts since 1994 t.o peu tho Employment Nondiacrimination
Art CENDAl concerning sexual orientation, ..,. •upra note 15. C<lngrell8 already hM
am1ide~ a poetic diocrimination bill, althoush it hM not poased. Stt IU[NO , , _
171-76 Md a-.npanying text.
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eventually sufficient public policy support and political clout
coalesce to provoke passage of the law.' " Unless one views the
people protected by genetic discrimination laws as disabled
individuals, who are protected by the ADA, then this
incubation has not happened. Rather, the frightening prospect
that science and technology could penetrate deep within our
zone of privacy - into our genetic composition - has resulted in
the passage at the state level and consideration at the federal
level of new anti-discrimination law.
The more deliberative and gradual process behind other
anti-discrimination laws served two important purposes. First,
it showed that the problems at issue were pervasive and that
existing law was inadequate. It is not yet so clear that the
problem of genetic discrimination is pervasive enough and that
existing law is inadequate to address the problem."' One can
think of other groups of people who are discriminated against
in employment, including perhaps parents"" and the physically
unattractive."' However, the existence of such employment
discrimination will not prompt anti-discrimination law in the
foreseeable future. Second, the slower process behind past antidiscrimination legislation allowed time for political consensus
to develop to give the laws the imprimatur of actual public
policy, which is currently lacking within the context of genetic
discrimination. Although problems of discrimination may exist,
it does not necessarily follow that they should be addressed
through federal employment anti-discrimination legislation."'
1111

Cf. Smith, 111pra note 314, at 601· 12 (discussing factors that determine
which classee become protecled under law, including immutable cbaractoriatics,
history of discrimination, jot>.relatednesa of the characteri11tics, and J)Qlit.ica.1 power).
1 111
See sources cited 111pra note 36 (arguing that existing law addre111:1es the
problem to lhe extent that there is an tactual, a.s opposed to theoretical, problem).
11
•

Fedaral legislation has been proposed to prohibit employment
di&erimination against parents, and former President Clinton issued an executive order
on the iS1ue. See generally Smith, 1upro note 314, at 587 (diacussing the Ending
Discrimination Against Parents Act., S. 1907, 106th Cong. (lst Se... 1999) and
Executive Order No. 13,152), 65 Fed. Reg. 26115 (May 4, 2000).
u i See Elizabeth ~f, Adamitis, Appearance Jr,{atten: A Proposal to Prohibit
Appea.ratice DiacriminaJion in Emp/.qy1nent, 15 \VASH. L. Rsv. 195 (2000): Jennifer
Fowler-Hermes, The Beauty and the Bea.st i.n the \Vorkplace: Appearcmce-Based
Diacrimi.notion CJ.a.inu Under EEO Lowa, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2001, at 32. The District of
Columbia does prohibit employment discrimination based on ..per1Jonal appearance."
D.C. Code Ann. §2-1402.ll(a).
m &e Kim, supra note 20 (arguing that the anti-discrimination model is
inappropriate for addressing genetic privacy i&sues); Smith, supra note 314 (arguing
that anti-discrimination law is not an appropriate vehicle for addressing employment
discrimination against parents).
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The heavy artillery of employment anti-discrimination law
should be used sparingly because it is also the biggest target
for opponents of workplace regulation. It is not clear that it was
or is needed to combat genetic discrimination in employment.
Another cause for concern with genetic discrimination
laws is their relationship with the ADA."' The class of
protected persons under genetic discrimination laws resembles
the class protected by the ADA; indeed, the EEOC maintains
that genetic conditions are covered by the ADA. Th.e ADA has
been a controversial law that has generated a surprisingly low
number of plaintiffs' victories in the courts."' This occurrence
has even been described as a "backlash" against the ADA.• The
open definition of disability has led to many cases in which the
plaintiff presented a laughable claim of an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity. Such cases have
fueled media depictions of an employment law that permits
absurd claims... Even some scholars have been critical of the
ADA.•• Regardless of how one regards the ADA, it has had a
tumultuous run since its passage. To the extent genetic
discrimination laws ar e perceived to be similar to the ADA,
that perception does not presage a good future.
Finally, and more significant, is the issue of
redundancy. The EEOC takes the position that the ADA covers
most of the cases that would be covered by a genetic
discrimination law, and, in fact, it has filed suit in a case and
settled it.- Redundancy in employment law is undesirable. It
yields uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the state of

•• s..g•neroJly Kim, 1upra not.o 20, ot 1627-32.

,,. Stt gtneraJly Ruth Colke.t, TJ1e American.e with DW:ibilit~• Act: A Windfall
for 0.fend4nts, 34 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L. Rl!V. 99 (1999); Linda Hamilton Kriesor,
Foreword-Backlash Aaabrat the ADA: lnterdlacipllnory Perspective• and In1pl ic4tiol11

for Social Justice Sirateaw•, 21 BERKELEY J . EMr. & LAB. L. 1, 7.s (2000).
ru Sympoiium, Bockla1Jt Asai111r lht ADA: lt1terdi1ciplinory Per1pectlu11 a/id
Implications for Social Ju•tice StratqiH, 21 BERKEU!Y J . EMP. & LAB. L. I (2000).
• Krioger, •upra note 324, at 9-10; Cary LaCheen, A<hy Brealty PtM•,
Lumber Lung ond Juggler'• lh1pair: Th• Portrtzyal of th~ Am~rican1 with Di.iobilitiu
A<t on Ttlevuion and Radw, 21 BERKELEY J . EMP. & LAB. L. 223 !20001. Many or
Gerald Skoning's ten "wackis~ t:mployme:nt caaa in his annual au.rvey in tM
Notional I.mo Journal have been ADA CAMS. S.., •-6., Gerald D. Skoning, Wor•plWac•ineu Uou On. NA'l'L LJ., Mar. 26, 2002 at Al&.
"" S.., e.g., Samuel UaacbarolT & Justin Nelaon, l>Ucrimi/llJ.lion With a
Diff•renct: Con Employmcnl Di«riminaliM Low Accommodau IM Amui<lon.t With
DUobililiu Ad?, 79 N.C. L. l!EV. 807 (2001).
mi See supro not.es 95..97 and accompanying text.
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the law and excessive litigation."' Additionally, a new antidiscrimination statute, if it were under the jurisdiction of the
EEOC (and the EEOC has argued for it)'"' would spread more
thinly the resources of the already overburdened agency.'"
In sum, anti-discrimination employment law is a
powerful tool that has done the heavy lifting of declariug and
implementing important public policy. Rather than basing our
anti-discrimination laws on preventing dignitary harms to
insular groups, we have based them primarily on the equal
opportunity principle. As influential and successful as the
federal employment anti-discrimination Jaws have been, they
are inviting targets for those who oppose regulation of the
workplace. No parts of employment anti-disc."rimination law
have been more controversial than harassment law and the
ADA 'l'o protect our anti-discrimination laws, we should enact
new ones with great reluctance and only after we have
examined all options.
D.

Marginalization of Employment Law

Employment Jaw in the United States is increasingly
recognized as a distinct area of Jaw, so much so that it has
become compartmentalized.'" This has some positive and
negative ramifications. Broadly, it is good that legally
regulating this important facet of life is viewed as worthwhile.
On the negative side, employment law has been
"marginaliz(ed) - lawyers and courts alike have acted as if
employment law were something 'special,' existing outside the
bounds of ordinary contract and tort law."'"' Moreover,
employment at will has taken on a substantive life beyond the
rebuttable presumption that it is."' It occupies so much of the
domain of employment Jaw that courts do not apply standard
a• See Summers, aupro noto 35, at 18-19 {predicting that reconc:iling
overlapping protections would be the most difficult problem in employment law and
slating that "lo)ne can scarcely llllagine an arrangement better deei,gned to hold out
promises to the employee, harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers,
and clog the legal machinery").
Mn EEOC Heo.d Stresses Agtncy'tJ Need to Handle Genetic BiM Ccmplai.nt1,

DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 14, 2002 (No. 31). nt A6.
'" Smith, supra note 314, at 610·11.
P2 See supra note 14 (discussing the emergence or employment law as a
dist.inct area of the law).
""Parker, supra note23,at352.
"' Id. at 349-52.
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contract and tort principles in the same way that they do in
other contexts. Writing about wrongful discharge law,
Professor J. Wilson Parker argued that lawyers, judges and
scholars should stop viewing employment law as a ~boutique
area of the lawn and apply common-law principles to wrongful
discharges.•
The marginalization concern also applies to the
problems of electronic monitoring, genetic discrimination, and
bullying. Employment law is margina li zed, as Parker suggests,
but I would modify the view that ho attributes to lawyers,
judges, and scholars. The area of employment law is dominated
by two great pillars: employment at will and statutory
employment law (principally employment anti-discrimination
law). Thus, absent statutory employment law, courts arc not
likely to apply common law contract and tort theories and
principles in a normal way."' An explanation for the atrophy of
common law in employment is that courts may be paralyzed by
fear that permitting recovery on a contract or tort theory by an
employee will encroach too much on the employer prerogatives
embodied in employment at will.
An alternative explanation is that courts may take
comfort in the insulation provided by the at-will doctrine; they
do not have to second-guess employers' decisions because
normal contract and tort principles are blunted by employment
at will."' A good example of this is Qmibedeaux u. Dow
Chemical Co .... In that case, one employee physically attacked
another, and both were discharged pursuant to the company's
no-fighting policy. The plaintiff sued the company under n
vicarious liability theory for tho battery committed by the coemployee and sought as elements of damages past and future
lost wages and benefits resulting from the termination. Under
the extended liability principle for intentional torts, as applied
by the lower court, a plaintiff may recover for all dnmages

~· ld. flt 354. 369 ("'The same lnw U1nt governs a too.sumer purcha1e or
personal injury suit ahou1d also apply to one's livelihood.-).
P"rkcr anya .. It.Iha heart of trepidaUon rc81.1 with a reluctanc.-e to interfere
with bueinee• judament-u.nquestionably • legltJmnle concern.• Id.. at 856. Trepidation
aside, judicial ndmini.atJ>ation and docket management may better expla.in courte'
reliance on employment at will; it is a convenient tool for dismiuing ca.see.
., 5ft Nicholu v. AlllltaU. bu. Co., 739 So. 2d 830, &49-52 (La. Ct. App. 1999)
<Caraway, J ., diOM!lting). rw'd, 765 So. 2d 1017
2000).
- 820 So. 2d 642 (La. 2002).
111
•

a...
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flowing from the tort, whether foreseeable or not."" The state
supreme court reversed, however, stating that "victim
compensation, which is one of the primary policies supporting
vicarious liability, must give way to the employment-at-will
doctrine, which furthers broader societal policies, such as
maintaining a free and efficient flow of human resources."'"
Examples of courts' treatments of the torts of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of
privacy also demonstrate the skewing of common law principles
by employment at will. Courts generally will not find
intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case in which
the plaintiff was terminated because to do so would provide a
theory to circumvent employment at will.' " Invasion of privacy
cases also show that employers' interests overwhelm
employees' interests, as courts conclude that employees do not
have reasonable expectations of privacy in the workplace, and
even if they do, the invasions are not highly offensive because
of employers' interests in workplace management.'" Thus, the
marginalizat1on of employment law means that the general
common law of torts and contracts provides little recourse to
employees. Instead, their recourse is largely in federal and
state statutory Jaw. In turn, the preeminence of statutes slowly
eviscerates the common law of employment.
But why is this bad, given the preference of many in the
legal profession, including scholars, for legislation? First, the
day is coming, if it has not already come, when meaningful
employment statutes will be difficult, and perhaps impossible,
to pass. As discussed above, in the wrongful termination
context, statutes cannot be enacted until employers become
frustrated with and afraid of the common law.'" Then, when
the statutes are enacted, they often take away the advantages
that employees had under the common law. As previously
discussed, the past decade has not seen one major federal
"'' Quebedeaux v, Dow Chem. Co., 809 So. 2d 983, 989 (La. Ct. App. 2001),
rev'd, 820 So. 2d 54 2 !Lo. 2002).
- Quebedeaux, 820 So. 2d at 546. Throo justices concurred and stated
different r•tionaJes for reversing, and one expressly stated that he djd not think the
&tatement about employment ·st Y.'ill was: correct. Id. at 547 (Calogero, C.J.,

concurring).
s.i See supra notes 200·02 and accompanying text. See also Austin, supra note
200, at 8-12; Gergen, 1upra note 28, at 1702-03.
•n See supra notes 114·32 and 8ccompanying text. See also Wilborn, supra
note 19, at 844-46; Kesan, supra note 19, at 302-04; Makdisi, supra note 20, at 1019-25.
1
"
See supra note 264 and aCC"Ompanying text.
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employment law, despite the significance of emerging issues.
Even the vapid electronic monitoring notification bills have not
been enacted at the federal level or by California.... Thus, one
result of marginalization is that even when legislatures do pass
statutes, employees get minimum rights statutes that give
them very little. Moreover, it has grown increasingly difficult to
enact even those laws.
Second, cordoning off employment law in a realm of
federal and state legislation permits courts to reject common
law theories with aplomb. Consider, for example, the impact
that passage of an electronic monitoring notification statute,
which would do very little to protect the privacy rights and
dignity of employees, likely would have on the tort of invasion
of privacy. If an employer gave the notification required by the
statute, courts would find no invasion of privacy regardless of
how egregious it was.
Common law tort and contract theories are the stuff of
everyday life. With the recognition that work has become
perhaps the predominant aspect of life in the United States, it
is ironic that we have permitted tho law governing that aspect
to become so marginalized and entrusted to a single method of
regulation.'" However, some scholars have decried a significant
role for common law in regulating the workplace."• Although
the com.moo law cannot and should not be the primary means
of employment regulation,"' it has historically been a piece of
the approach, and it is still needed."' We have become so
enamored of legislation that we seem to have forgotten that
there are some matters better left to common law. There are
several strong reasons, recounted above, why one should be
cautious about new legislation. The employment law of tho
future will be less responsive to both employer and employee
141

See supra note. 160·62 nod occ:ompllnylng text.

,., Cf. Be.rn&tein, eupra note 39, at 1664. (..As between a new

tort and a
vigorous display or group-baaed actlvitm, I admit a bit or a bias in favor or the DOW
tort.").
... See, e..1., Duffy, 1upro note 201, at 892 ("'Civil tort litigation ia not a.n ideal
inatrument to brini about radica.1 chan1e In the bnlan~ of power in the workplace an.d
moy well delay the search for effective methods of enforcing workers' richt1.")•
..., D.au-&hmidt, tupro oot.e 23, 1t 700 ("'Oiven it.a limitation1 . .. it eeema
unlikely r.hAt adaptali<>n o{ the a>mmoo law will ever become the primary ll1Ml1I of
ocldn!osing employee dema.odll in lhia country.").
- S<e Samuel Juacbaroll', Conlra<till6 for Emp/.oytnUll: T~ LimiUd Ruurn
of th• Common Lau>, in GLOBAL COlolPETITIOH, eupro note 261. at 499, 534 (deacribing
the common law's role as a fallback apin1t voids .... uJtinc &om decline in coUectivo
ba:ra:aininc and the partial coverage oft.he anti-diec::rimination laws).
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needs if it abandons the common Jaw approach and accedes to a
rigid statutory framework.
V . R EINVIGORATING THE COMMON LAW OF THE W ORKPLACE

In the 1970s and 1980s courts and scholars actively
worked with the common law to address the issue of wrongful
discharge. Courts recognized the employment tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public pol.icy, the tort or contract
theory (deponcling on tho state) of breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and various other common law
theories of recovery.' " In those regards, the California and
Michigan courts were particularly active and creative, and the
Montana courts drove employers to support wrongful discharge
legislation.• It is time to reinvigorate the common law in the
context of employment to address workplace privacy and
harassment issues. New tort theories do not appear to be
needed,•• but intentional infliction of emotional distress (IlEO)
and invasion of privacy must be re-evaluated and redefined
wi thin the workplace context. "'
A.

Retrofitting llltentional Infl,iction of Emotional Distress:
Substantive

To adjust IIED to address general harassment in the
workplace, courts must lower the bar of "outrageous~ conduct
in the employment setting. Courts have recognized the te.nsion
between the wide berth given to management prerogative

:m• Ste s11pro noLea 287·39 and accompanying text.
IMl St!t 111pro notee 253·66 and accompanying t.cxt.
ui It i& temptin1 to TeCOmmend a new tort, which I gueu I would ceU
workplace abuse, u Pror•-r Blad.. did in 1967 with •bu.Ive diocbarge. See •upra
note 238. I reoiol that tempuodoo for oeveral l'OQOn1. Pirot., when Prorouor Bladeo
propooe.d lhe new IDn. l.Mre wu no tort theory thu addretMCI wrongful dilocharge.
5-od, Prof0$0Qr Bernoi.in hu dJocuosed tbe difficuftieo 0(1u.....fW(y ettating a MW
IA>rL B•rnslein, aupro note 39. Why race the aubotantial likelihood lhot o oew IA>rt will
rau when there are existing tort& that can be modified to do the job? Thitd, to create a
new e.mployment...speeiRc tort further compartment.aUzes employment law. and as l
have explained above, 1 think t.hot result is undesirable.
162
Going against. the grain of favoring new flmploymcnt legislation, several
achola.1"$ have recommended common law approaches to workplace is11uce. Kesan, '"Pro
note 19, at 322-32 (proposing a contract solution to electronic privacy is.sues);
Ehrenreich, supra note 23, at. .t4-63 (proposing that. an a<ijust.ed intentional infliction
theory supplement sexual hanwmeot law); Makdisi, •upro note 20, at 1019-25
(1uggMting that an ~Wiled IA>rt theory of invasion or privacy e&n effectively oddreoa
ll"'DeDc intzusions).
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under employment at will and the competing idea that
workplace environments are a setting in which severe
emotional distress is particularly likely to occur. There are
several facets of the employment setting that make it a
breeding ground for severe emotional distress: a hierarchical
organization with authority vested in supervisors; the everpresent threat of discipline or termination and consequent peril
of loss of livelihood; a captive audience, in that victims of
harassment may not leave work simply because they are
distraught; and almost constant contact with and exposure to
the same people."' Because employment in this nation is so
closely identifled with one's value and identity in society,"' and
because so many needs, such as health insurance and
retirement plans, are tied to employment, employees place the
well-being of themselves iµid their families at risk when they
go to work.
Courts have struck tho balance lopsidedly, resolving the
vast majority of the cases in favor of management prerogative
rather than the workplace distress factors. In large pnrt, then,
it is the threat to employment at will posed by IIED that bas
caused courts to keep the bar so high. It is one thing, however,
for courts to say that not every termination gives rise to an
IlED claim, and another to say that no case in which
harassment ends in termination or constructive discharge can
give rise to an IIED claim. Because employees have so much at
risk in their jobs and are subject to so many pressures,
Professor Rosa Ehrenreich recommends that the workplace be
considered "an inherently aggravating factor" in IIED claims."'
Her suggestion, thus, is for courts to restrike the balance on
IIED in the workplace, giving greater weight to the
characteristics of the workplace that make it more stressful
than other settings, and less weight to the need of employers to
manage the workplace through some level of mental distress.
While the employment-at-will conce.m s that courts have
about IIED in the workplace will render most courts reluctant
to articulate an "inherently aggravating factor" standard,
Ehrenreich has indicated the direction in which courts should
move and provided the supporting rationale. Indeed, a
straightforward application of tort law principles to
Stt$ e.s., ~nttich, aupro note 23, at 45~62.
_. Id. at 49. Set altJO •upra nole 37.
• • Ehrenreich, 1upra note 23, at 49.
•
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employment would suggest that courts should lower the
threshold of outrageous conduct in the workplace. Early cases
applied lower standards for outrageous conduct, permitting
recovery for insults in cases involving customers interacting
with public utilities and common carriers,"' and this was later
expanded to innkeepers.
Many of the same reasons for recognizing a special
relationship between the foregoing entities and their customers
also apply to employers and employees."' Thus, regardless of
whether courts are willing to expressly state that employment
is an "inherently aggravating factor," consistent with
established tort principles, courts can lower tho standards for
the elements of IIED in the workplace. Moreover, although this
Article does not advocate for a general harassment statute,
courts could fashion a more useful and appropriate standard
for outrageous workplace conduct by using protected-<:11188
harassment cases to inform the types of conduct that might be
considered outrageous. Thus, courts could look for guidance to
cases of conduct found to be severe or pervasive enough to
constitute sexual, racial, religious, national origin, ago, or
disability harassment.
B.

Retrofitting Invasion of Privacy: Substantive

Invasion of privacy (principally intrusion on seclusion)
is a flexible theory that can address electronic monitoring and
genetic invasions.* Regarding genetic discri.mination, tort
theory could augment the coverage already provided by the
Americans with Disabilities Act and state genetic
discrimination laws. For electronic monitoring, invasion of
privacy should be aqjusted to play a central role in light of the
failure of the notice bills to be enacted, and their inadequacy to
provide meaningful protection even if enacted.
The most pressing need is for courts to recognize that
employees can have privacy expectations in the workplace by
prohibiting employers from destroying privacy expectations
" ' R&s'TAT£MENT (SECOND), supra note 115,

f

48; DOBOS, 1upra note 117,

f

303.

"' See, •.1.. Bodewig v, K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657, M-0-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1981),
rev. <kn~ 644 P.2d 1128 (Qr. 1982) (permitting reoovery for reckl••• iAJliction of
emotional di.8-trea becaUM employer-employee i• a "'apeclal relatiooahip• involvinc an
imbalance of power).

• S.. Makdioi, •upra note 20, at 1004.
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through policies and statements. Until that change occurs,
unrealistic contract notions that the employer and employee
have agreed upon little or no expectation of privacy will
continue to undermine the tort theory.• In employment,
negotiation and agreement on privacy rarely occurs, and tort
law should recognize a duty of employers to respect employeea'
reasonable expectations of privacy and not permit employers to
disclaim it. Although it may take some work by courts and
perhaps trumping of contract law by tort law, there are general
tort principles that courts could apply to halt employer
eviscerations of employee privacy expectations. For example,
duress or coercion may render consent ineffective."' An
alternative or additional ground for rendering consent an
ineffective defense could be that the invasion exceeded the
scope of the consent.••
If a court chooses to emphasize the contract aspects of
the privacy tort, there are other contract rationales under
which courts could hold unenforceable employees' agreements
to waive privacy rights. For example, a waiver may be
unenforceable na violating public policy when there is a
significant disparity of bargaining power between the parties."'
Another tenet requires that waivers be knowing and
voluntary.• On the other side of the Catch-22 of intrusion upon
seclusion, if an employee refuses to permit the intrusion, courts
can find that attempts to intrude satisfy the intrusion
requirement based upon the power imbalance and the effect on
the employee of the attempted intrusion ...

C.

Retrofitting Both Intentional Infl,iction of Emotional
Distress and Invasion of Privacy: Procedural

There are two important procedural changes that
should be made to the applicable torts. First, for both IlED and
invasion of privacy, the most necessary a<ijustment is for courts

•

Spencer, aupro note 56, at 8?0.

... RKSTATEMENT (SECON'D). •upra note 115, f 8928(3).

*" Id"· 11et also RESTAT8f.lENT(SEOOND), 1upra note 116, § 892A(4).
"' &., t ./I., Doe v. Smithkline Boochn1n Corp., 855 S.W.2d 24S, 263 (Tex. CL
App. 1993), affd a• modi(uul, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995)
•

Eetlund, •upro note 270, et 23-27.

- &., ..... Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serva., Inc., 485 So.2d 706, 709
Wa. 1983) O>oldinc that a<quisition o( infonruitlon rrom • plaintiH is not. requitite
element orintn11ion upon IOlitudei
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to refrain from granting so many summary judgments"' and to

let close cases proceed to trial. Juries have sufficient sympathy
for employees who aro harassed and subjected to invasions of
privacy.• Consider, for example, the Kentucky case, Stringer u.
Wal·Mart Stores, Inc.,"' in which four Wal-Mart clerks were
discharged for eating candy and nuts from damaged packages.
Wal-Mart claimed the employees had violated a store pilferage
policy, but the employees claimed they were following an
unwritten store policy whereby such food was left in the
employee lounges for consumption. The plaintiffs sued for
IlED, invasion of privacy and slander."" A jury awarded each
plaintiff five million dollars in compensatory and punitive
damages.•
The call for fewer summary judgments in this context is
not merely an ends-oriented approach. It is by no means clear
that the two elements on which IlED and invasion of privacy
claims are routinely dismissed on summary judgment outrageous conduct and expectation of privacy, respectively should be decided by courts as a matter of law. Because both
outrageous conduct and reasonable expectation of privacy
invoke societal standards, these questions, like breach in
negligence cases, aro appropriate for jury resolution, and only
rarely should be decided by courts.
Additionally, diverting more employment cases t.o
alternative dispute resolution methods could be a partial
panacea for the courts' tendency to dismiss employment tort
cases on summary judgment. It is possible that arbitrators and
* See, e41 .• Gera:on. 11•pra note 28, at 1726-33. Prore.ssor Boincr makes thi1
argument regarding sexual haro11n1ent case.a. Set Thereaa M. Bclncr, Ltt tM Jury
Decide: TM G4p lktwtt11 Whot Judget and Rea,.nabl• P•ople Believe la Sexually

Horo"i"ll, 75 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 791, 791-95 (2002).
• Stt Ge:l'ge.I\. •upro note 28. at 1736 (not.ins that juries are correctly
perceived to be biased -it11l •mployon in tort..-~ Schmidt v. Amoritecb Ill., 768
N.E. 2d 303 ffil. App. Cl. 2002)(overtuming awanl of$3 million in punitive~ to
employee in invuion of privacy claim where employer esamined home telephone
employH). Cf. Seiner, IWpro note 365, 842-46.
"" No. 95-Cl-00228 (K.y. Cir. Cl., judgment entered Jan. 19, 1999), reported
in, Wal-Mart Ordt,.d to Ptzy $20 Million to Four Store Clerkt Firrd for Eati111 Cond,y,
Individual Employment Rlght1 (BNA), Jan. 26, 1999 (No. 14), at 1.
"' See al"° Roth v. Forner-Boeken Co., No. 98-815 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Jan. 2, 2002),
reported in Soulh Dalwto Jury Award• $525,000 to Mn11 \Vito Cluim1 EmpW>~r Opened
Moil, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Feb. 5, 2002 (No. 24), at A6.
,. &:-Wal-Mart StoffAroorrhd $20 Milli<>tt in K<ntucky 1Aw1uit, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 1999, at AIO; WaJ.Afon Ortkred to Poy $20 MU/ion to Four Store Clerlt.r Fired
for Eating Condy, 14 Individual Employment Righia (BNAl, Jan. 26, 1999 (No. 14~ at
L

""'°""or

t•
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20031

REVITALIZED COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

167

mediators may be more receptive than judges to claims of
workplace abuse ....
D.

Hope for Common Law Change and the Obstacle of
Rigid Courts

Is there any hope that courts will make any of the above
substantive and procedural changes in their approaches to the
tort theories?"' Many object that. the courts are too rigid to
adjust the common law torts to address these problems."'
Soveral responses are in order. First, the difficulty of effecting
change is no excuse to stop advocating for change."' All that is
needed is time and pressure."' The evolution of the common
law is oft.en slow, but it docs evolve to address new challenges
and reflect society's evolving values.m General recognition in
tort of recovery for emot.ional distress injuries has taken place
largely within the last. forty years, and mostly within the past.
t.hirty .... Because of the limitat.ions of legislation and the value
of a common law approach t.o those problems, it is no answer t.o
dismiss the common law because of the difficulty and paco. As
with many things in life, t.ho fast.est and seemingly easiest
approach is not necessarily the best.

w.,...,.,

"" Stt, <.(/., Po1U/ Ord1t'I Do<u Ch1ml«1/ to R•ln•au a Dozen
Piml
for B· Moll Abua, •upro nole 66 Carbitratlon panel ordered reinstatement of L2
emplo,.... becaUM or di1paraU1 Lrealm•nl und•• &mall policy); Olt!Moma future Co.
and Cal'Jlftnurs, 1-al 9<13, 01-02 Lab. Arl>. Awards (CCH), t 3912 (July 7, 2001)
(arbitnt.or awarded rei.nat.Atem@nt to employee fh~ for insubordination becau.u
employoo wu provokod by 1upervi10r'I bullylna) (citing Yamada, •upru """' 18). An
•rbitn.t.or •warded a termlnaU!d employee $200,000 ror intentional iniliction o(
emolJonal distress, butt.he di•Lric:C. ooun vacated lllo award in Hughe. Tra.lning, Inc:. v,
Cook,
F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001). Tho srbltr•tlon •111"..,ment oolabliahod a broader
standard or rov·iew- the judiciel atandard or review-than normally applies to arbitrs.1

™

nwArds.
ru See \Vilborn, supra note 19, nt 864 (a oom1non law appnnu;h to privacy
tissues would require "c:onaideroblc judlc:lnl ac:tlviam.'' And courts do not. appeflr willing
t.o engage in such); Kcs.an, t1upra note 19, ot 322 (suggesting that courts may 11.ap in t.o
limit employer monitoring, but it i1 unJikcly bated on pa.st record).
m Stt, e.g .• Ehrenreich, 1upro not.o 23, at 55-66 (addressing the rigid court.t
olliection).
:an Id.

"' Stt THE SHAWSllANK RllOE.MPnOll (Columbia Pictures 1994).
.,. Bhronreich, 1upro note 23. at 66-66; Cf. 8el'lllU!in, •upro nc>Ce 39, at 1565
c-the measured, respect(uJ IDOYemenl O( a new tort will always appur (eebfe l.O
activiall •...").
- &e g<Mrolly Nancy Levlt, Bth<l'Mi Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. Rf;v. 136
(1992). Cf. Martha Chamallaa, The Archlted•re cf B ioa: Dttp Slruduru in Tor< Law,
146 U. PA. L. REY. 463 (1998).
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A second reason to have hope for the common law
changes discussed above is the influence of existing statutory
law on the tort theories. Both IIED and invasion of privacy
became more successful tort theories after the emergence of
Title VII harassment law. 'l'he infl uence of harassment law
under Title VII has made llED a more successful theory in the
employment context.m The ADA, with its limitations on preemployment medical testing and other limitations on the
dissemination and use of information about disabilities, should
bolster the invasion of privacy tort in the context of genetic
discrimination. Although there is not as much federal law
relevant to electronic monitoring, a recent case under the
Federal Wiretap Act indicates that the case Jaw under federal
statutes could strengthen the privacy tort with respect to
electronic monitoring. Specifically, in Smith u. Deuers,"" a
federal district court reversed the granting of summary
judgment on claims under the Federal Wiretap Act and the tort
of invasion of privacy where an employer taped private
telephone conversations of an employee.
A third reason to hope and beHevc that courts will make
acijustmcnts in the torts is the change in IIED in Texas in
recent years. Texas is one of the strongest at-will states in the
nation,'" but its courts have permitted the development of IIED
in the workplace. 'l'he Texas Supreme Court recognized IIED in
a workplace resulting in resignations in GTE Southwest, Inc. u.
Bruce.- Practitioners predicted that the case would make it
more difficult for employers to obtain summary judgments on
IIED claims.'" A survey of Texas cases appears to support this
prediction, although employers still win quite a few.~ In one of
the most conspicuous of the post-GTE Southwest IIED cases in
'" Stt 1upro notot 27·28 and accompanying t.oxt..
"' 2002 WL 76803 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2002).
"' Cf. Sabine Pilol Serv., Inc. v. Haucli, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Ta 19851
(recognizing narrow public poUcy exception lO employmenl It will); Mont11>mery
County Hoap. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1998) Cdiocu..ing lhe epeciftclly or
11t.a~ent. required for Tex.as court.I t.o find an employment contract of definite
duntionl.
- 998 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1999). For di5cuaioo of' the cue Ind C0<1$icleralion of
both prior Texas caMI law lnvolving OED in the workplace and the nmificationt or the
GTE Southwtat case on fuLure workplace claims, see Dudley 0 . Jordan, &pand;.ng tM
Pot.ential for Recouery of Afental Ang11J1h Damage• 111 t~ Employ1nerit Setting: A Case
Nou on GTE Southweot. lnc. v. Bruce. 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 461 (2000).
"' Earl M. Jon... m. et al, Employment and Labor Law, 54 SMU L. R£v.
1307. 1332 (2001).
"' Id. at 1332-36.
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the Texas courts, an appellate court affirmed an award of
approximately ten million dollars, including eight million
dollars in exemplary damages, to a former employee who sued
for sexual harassment end IIED."'
Even more recently, a Connecticut case indicates that
some courts ere becoming more receptive to IIED claims in the
workpiece setting. In Benton u. Simpson,.. five plaintiffs sued
their manager for IIED based on his temper tantrums,
profanity-laced tirades, and physical acts such as pounding on
file cabinets. The plaintiffs testified that the defendant made
statements such es, "You women make me sick, you're like a
cancer."*

Tho plaintiffs requested a prejudgment remedy to
secure a monetary award in the case. The trial court conducted
a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to
believe that tho plaintiffs would prevail. Remarkably, the trial
court determined that there was probable cause and ordered an
etta.chment on the equity in the defendant's house in the
amount of one hundred thousand dollars. Aliirming, the
appellate court commented on the outrage element of the tort:
"(B)ecause the plaintiffs and defendant worked in close
proximity to one another end because of tho nature of the
employment relationship, it was difficult for the plaintiffs to
avoid continued interaction with the defendant."·""
Thus, common law tort theories can be modified to
effectively
address
electronic
monitoring,
genetic
discrimination, and general harassment. Critics of a common
law approach are understandably skeptical that courts will
make the needed adjustments. However, es described above,
there is reason to believe that the torts will evolve to reflect
society's values in addressing these problems. Although the
pace of common law change is slower, the benefits should be
worth the wait.

- Rolfman·La Rocho, lnc. v. Zeltwanger, 69 S.W.3d 634 (Tox. App. 2002).
The Hoffmon·Lo RocM oue involved sexual h.uuament, howevu, and tho wlllingneu
or courta to pennh. recovery don not always tnlnslate to 1t..lu1-neutral harusment.

For exo.mpJe, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that aexual hara11me.nt might
be considered outrageous in B111tClmeto v. Tuc/w,r, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992), but it
re:versed a judgment fol' & man who was tho victim of a pattern of haranment in
Nidtcloa v. All·Stat. Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 1017 (La. 2000).
"' 829 A.2d 68 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
"' Id. at 71.
3
Id. at. 74.
•
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The Relationship Between Workers' Compem1ation Law
and a Tort Approach

Somo point to state workers' compensation laws as a
potential problem for tort law solutions in the employment
context. The concern is that exclusivity provisions in many
states' laws render employers immune from tort lawsuits...
However, this should not be a significant impediment to a tortbased approach. Either tort law or workers' compensation law
is available to provide a remedy, and under some workers'
compensation laws, both will be available. Most notably, under
many state compensation Jaws, the excl usivity provision does
not apply to intentional torts,.. allowing a plaintiff suing for
IIED... or invasion of privacyM to recover in tort.
lf a plaintiff is in a jurisdiction that does not have an
exception for intentional torts or the plaintiff is unable to prove
an intentional tort, the plaintifi's tort clajm may still survive.
Many states have heightened requirements for workers'
compensation coverage of mental iajuries caused by mental
stress.'" While thjs seemingly inures to the benefit of the
employer, it can have an ironic effect. If tho injured employee
cannot satisfy the heightened requirements for workers'
compensation coverage, then the exclusivity provision may not
apply (i.e., no coverage, no exclusivity), and the employee may
be able to sue for negligence.•
A second role for workers' compensation law would be as
a factor for courts to use in evaluating conduct to determine
whether it is sufficiently outrageous under an llED claim or
highly offensive under an invasion of privacy claim. If courts
find that no workers' compensation remedy is available, that
should be a basis for lowering the bar for tort recovery. This is
justified in view of the history of workers' compensation laws in
relation t.o tort law. Workers' compensation laws were adopted
to provide a remedy for workplace injuries when tort defenses

' " Stt, •·B·· Ehrenteich, aupro note 23, at 56-57 (diacuaaing this problem with
a torts approach to workplaoo injuries).
,., 1 MODERN WORKERS COMP&NSA'MON f 102.13 (Clark &anlrnan Callaghan
1993).

a•

PERRITI', 1upro not.e ll5, at§ 8.13.

•• S...,

•·I·• Karch v. BayBanlt FSB, 794 A.2d 763 (N.H. 2002).

•• l MODERN WORKERSCoMP&NSATION, 1upro note 388, f 109.29.
• Richanl80n v. Home Depot U.$.A., 808 So. 2d 5« <La. Ct. App. 2001~
Grimm v. US WHt Communications, In<., 64-4 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2002).
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barred recovery. The interaction between tort law and workers'
compensation always bas been to provide a remedy for workers
injured in the workplace.
The role of the workers' compensation laws when they
were first enacted in the early 1900s was to provide benefits in
cases in which tort recoveries were virtually impossible...
Then, lawmakers were concerned with rampant physical
injuries resulting during the rise of industrialism. Now, as
mental distress becomes a growing concern because of bullying,
electronic monitoring, and genetic testing, a balance can be
struck between the workers' compensation law and tort law to
provide coverage for injuries.'" Accordingly, one can see
workers' compensation laws not as a problem or obstacle in tort
responses to employment law issues, but as part of a solution
that acljusta existing and malleable tort theories to address
emerging workplace issues.
VI. CONCLUSION

There are a number of problems with legislatlvo
solutions to emerging workplace problems, particularly
invasion of privacy, genetic discrimination, and bullying. The
epoch of reliance on statutory responses to employment
problems bas had two unfortunate consequences. First, the
common law, which has been such an important part of the law
regulating people's daily lives, has lost ground in one of the
major relationships of modern life: work. Second, and relatedly,
when there is no employment statute to act as a check, the
dominance of employment at will and the related notions of
employer power and prerogative skew common law doctrine
and analysis.
Modem common law solutions can correct these
distortions. True, common Jaw will not eliminate harmful
conduct in the workplace as fast as federal statutes, but federal
statutes creating meaningful and worthwhile protections of
employees' dignity are not going to be enacted. Moreover, it is

tlllJ

Sta, ,,,.,

1

AR1'1fUR LARsoN, LAnSON 9 WORKMEN'S CO,.IPENSATION: DESK

EDITION If 4 .80 & 6.20 (1982).

* For example, a Louisiana 1tote court, noting that there was oo worken'
compensation coverage for an employee'• men~I distress iqjuriee, permitted I.he
negligent infliction cloim to go forward, noting that an employtr'1 dut;y to provide a
safe work place includes a duty to avoid caU1iD1 e '"mental breakdown.* Rklaord«Jl1.
808 So. 2d at 650 CIA. Ct. App. 2001).
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not clear that they should be. There are problems of fit, timing,
and overuse oflogislation. One of the positive characteristics of
the common law is that it can and does adjust to reflect
society's values."' That tort law would not impose liability in as
many cases as some employee rights advocates wish is not
necessarily bad.• The Supreme Court has been adamant th.a t
not even Title VII is a general civility code that will address
every unpleasantry..,
Writing about 11ED in the context of wrongful
discharges, Professor Mark Gergen recognized its rare
successes and defended its use for egregious cases."' Gergen
remarked on an important aspect of the role for the common
law in employment cases. In areas in which the conduct is
difficult to define and there are important competing interests
such that tho society is not willing to pass meaningful
legislation, tort law and contract law should fill the breach. The
common law patrols the ambiguous border of acceptability,
catching the cases that clearly cross over. What is needed now
to improve American workplaces is for the common law to catch
more cases of harassment, electronic monHoring, and genetic
discriminat.ion. That can and should be done without new
legislation.
Federal legislation was needed to deal with
discriminators in the last century. It is not yet clear that
controlling electronic and genetic privacy invaders and bullies
requires more legislation. With common law filling some gaps,
over time society will discover whether legislation is needed
and appropriate. Until then, however, what we need is a
revitalized common law of the workplace .

., Stt, '-6·· M•nhall S. Sbopo, /n lh< looAiJ18 014U: Whot Torta &hdonloip
Can Tra<h U• About lh< Am•ri<On Experit.n«, S9 NW. U. L. REY. 1567, 1569 (1995)
(-c'ort jurisprudence ,, • rel11tively accurate renect0r or American society'• baaic
principJes for microgovemance.•).
.. See Ehrenrelc:h, 1upra note 23, at 31 n.127 (observing that Profesaor
Austin "casts her net too broadly" in trying to pull within tho ombit of UED workplace

oonduc.t that. is merely unpleaaant.); Kim, aupra note 17, at. 691 (arguing th.at not every
violation ofpriva.cy should have a legal remed;y bec1tuse "'ll)omo intrusions are ao trivial
that they will be expttie.nced by mo.t people as me.re annoyance• or rudeness.•).
"' Oncale v. Sundownor Offabore Serva., Inc.. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
~. •upro n.C. 28, at 1737-39.
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